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Putting State Courts in the Constitutional
Driver's Seat: State Taxpayer Standing After
Cuno and Winn
by EDWARD A. ZELINSKY
I. Introduction
Ohio provided a franchise tax credit to corporations which
invested in "manufacturing machinery and equipment" within the
Buckeye State.' In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that Ohio taxpayers lack standing in the
federal courts to challenge this state tax credit as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.! Similarly, Arizona provides an income
tax credit for contributions to school tuition organizations. In
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, a narrowly
divided Court held that Arizona taxpayers also lack standing in the
federal courts to mount an Establishment Clause challenge to this
state tax credit.' Taken together, Cuno and Winn definitively
terminated the possibilities of taxpayer standing previously opened by
Flast v. Cohen.s
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I write to evaluate state taxpayer standing after Cuno and Winn.'
In particular, I write to explore state taxpayers' standing to mount the
kind of federal constitutional challenges to state taxes and
expenditures raised in those two cases. I come to three principal
conclusions. First, because the states have more liberal taxpayer
standing rules than do the federal courts, Cuno and Winn will not
terminate taxpayers' constitutional challenges to state taxes and
expenditures, but will instead channel such challenges from the
federal courts (where taxpayers do not have standing) to the state
courts (where they do). Second, municipal taxpayer standing in the
federal courts, which persists after Cuno and Winn, is an historic
anomaly, given what is now a near-absolute bar in the federal courts
on state taxpayer standing. Third, as a result of the channeling caused
by Cuno and Winn, in the future, state courts will develop a body of
law under the U.S. Constitution governing state taxes and outlays.
This body of law will be beyond direct Supreme Court review because
of that Court's rejection of state taxpayer standing in the federal
courts. At least at the margins, and perhaps more fundamentally,
state court judges will be more inclined than their federal
counterparts to uphold state tax and expenditure policies against
constitutional challenges. Consequently, these state-friendly cases
premised on the U.S. Constitution, as developed by the state courts
and unsupervised by the Supreme Court, will be more permissive
toward state policies than would a comparable corpus of cases
decided by federal judges. This result will be untidy, but potentially
manageable.
The first section of this Article outlines the Supreme Court's pre-
Cuno taxpayer standing case law, from its origins in Frothingham v.
Mellon' through ASARCO v. Kadish.8 This is a circuitous story of
negation, followed by expansion, and culminating in disorderly
6. Unfortunately, we do not have a convenient phrase to distinguish a taxpayer's
standing for a particularized challenge to the taxpayer's own individual tax liability from a
taxpayer's standing to mount a more generalized, public interest-type challenge to taxes
and public outlays in the absence of such particularized harm. Taxpayer standing of the
latter sort is the focus of this Article. Thus, the phrase "taxpayer standing" in this Article
refers to a taxpayer's ability to contest, not his own individualized tax liability, but taxes
and expenditures as they generally affect all taxpayers. This Article makes clear when it
refers to taxpayer standing as an objection to individual tax liability.
7. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
8. 490 U.S. 605 (1989). After Cuno, the Court decided Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). While important for purposes of federal
standing doctrine, Hein was not part of the background against which the Court decided
Cuno.
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retreat as the U.S. Supreme Court moved from a rule of no-state-
taxpayer-standing to a more expansive approach, but then reverted
back to a restrictive view of state taxpayer standing, accompanied by
continuing dissent advocating the broader standing possibilities raised
by Flast. Against this background, the second section of this Article
discusses Cuno and Winn. These decisions ended the disorder of the
post-Flast retreat by firmly establishing that state taxpayers lack
standing in the federal courts and that there is no longer a dissenting
strain seeking the broader possibilities for taxpayer standing raised by
Flast. Winn and Cuno have brought federal taxpayer standing law full
circle, back to Frothingham and Doremus and the denial of standing
in the federal courts to both federal and state taxpayers.
The third section of this Article reviews state taxpayer standing
rules. These rules generally grant state taxpayers the standing they
now lack in the federal courts. The fourth section of this Article
concludes that, because of states' more liberal standing rules, Cuno
and Winn will shift state taxpayers' constitutional challenges to state
tax and budgetary policies from the federal courts (where state
taxpayers do not have standing) to the state courts (where they
typically do). The fifth section argues that municipal taxpayer
standing to contest local taxes and expenditures in the federal courts
is today an historic anomaly, given the virtual extinction of state
taxpayer standing in the federal courts after Cuno and Winn.
The sixth section of this Article predicts that, as a result of Cuno,
Winn, and the states' more liberal taxpayer standing rules, there will
emerge a body of constitutional law over which the U.S. Supreme
Court will have no direct supervisory authority-namely, the
decisions of state courts resolving state taxpayers' challenges under
the U.S. Constitution to state tax and spending policies. Taxpayers
will have standing to bring such constitutional challenges in the state
courts, but the U.S. Supreme Court will lack the ability to review
these decisions of the state courts because there is no taxpayer
standing in these cases in the federal courts. At least at the margins
and perhaps more fundamentally, this body of law, developed by the
state courts under the U.S. Constitution, will be more state-friendly
than would a comparable corpus of cases formulated by the federal
judiciary. As previously stated, this result will be messy, but
potentially workable.
3
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H. The Background to Cuno and Winn:
The Circuitous Path From Frothingham to ASARCO
A. Early Cases Denying Taxpayer Standing: Frothingham and Doremus
The circuitous path from Frothingham to Asarco is a path of
negation, then expansion, and ultimately disorderly retreat as the
Supreme Court, over consistent dissent, returned toward the
restricted view of state taxpayer standing it started with early in the
20th century.'
In Frothingham, the Supreme Court "first faced squarely the
question whether a litigant asserting only his status as a taxpayer has
standing to maintain a suit in federal court . . ..."" In that case, Mrs.
Frothingham, as "a taxpayer of the United States,"" claimed that the
expenditures authorized by the federal Maternity Act violated the
Tenth Amendment 2 and would "increase the burden of future
taxation and thereby take her property without due process of law."13
In denying her standing to sue, the Court contrasted a federal
taxpayer's "minute and indeterminable"" interest in the national fisc
with the "direct and immediate"" interest of a local taxpayer in a
locality's public outlays, an interest resembling "that subsisting
between stockholder and private corporation."" To invoke the power
of the federal courts to challenge a federal appropriations statute, the
party "must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement .. ."" In contrast to a
municipal taxpayer's significant interest in local expenditures, a
federal taxpayer's interest in the nation's fisc "is shared with millions
9. As part of a broader reconsideration of standing doctrine, Judge Fletcher is
skeptical of the concept of taxpayer standing. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 267-272 (1988) ("In sum, Flast, Valley Forge, Richardson and
Schlesinger should not be seen as a group of 'federal taxpayer cases."'). Whatever the
merits of this broader reconsideration, Winn and Cuno make clear that "taxpayer
standing" is a deeply embedded federal concept. This article therefore proceeds from that
concept.
10. Flast, 392 U.S. 83, 91 (1968).
11. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
12. Id. at 479.
13. Id. at 486.
14. Id. at 487.
15. Id. at 486.
16. Id. at 487.
17. Id. at 488.
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of others [and] is comparatively minute and indeterminable."" Any
particular federal appropriation's "effect upon future taxation" is too
"remote, fluctuating and uncertain"" to provide a basis for a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the federal statute authorizing
such appropriation.20
Moreover, the Frothingham Court observed, "[tihe
administration of any statute" like the Maternity Act "is essentially a
matter of public and not of individual concern."" If Mrs.
Frothingham, as a federal taxpayer, could challenge this Act, "then
every other taxpayer may do ... the same" as to any other federal
appropriations statute.2 The "attendant inconveniences" of this
conclusion indicated that Mrs. Frothingham's suit as a federal
taxpayer "cannot be maintained."" In the absence of a plaintiff
asserting "some direct injury suffered or threatened,"24 for the courts
to entertain litigation like Mrs. Frothingham's "would not be to
decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority
over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an
authority which plainly we do not possess."2
In denying Mrs. Frothingham's standing as a federal taxpayer,
Frothingham propounds the themes that the Court later explored in
taxpayer standing cases: Any federal taxpayer has a small and
uncertain interest in any particular federal outlay. That minute
interest, shared in common with myriad other federal taxpayers, is
best addressed politically, rather than judicially. Even if a federal
taxpayer could get a particular federal expenditure enjoined, there is
no guarantee that this would redress the harm to the taxpayer since
Congress might use the money saved for purposes other than the
reduction of the plaintiff-taxpayer's taxes. Permitting lawsuits like
Mrs. Frothingham's would open the floodgates to similar lawsuits and
would upset the separation of powers. Hence, a federal taxpayer, in
contrast to her local counterpart, cannot challenge a federal
expenditure in the federal courts. She can, of course, contest her own
particularized tax liability, but cannot challenge taxes and






24. Id. at 488.
25. Id. at 489.
5
governmental outlays as they affect the general public of which she is
a part.
A generation after Frothingham, in Doremus v. Board of
Education' Justice Jackson, writing for himself and five of his
colleagues," extended the no-taxpayer-standing rule of Frothingham
from federal to state taxpayers, while reiterating the different
standing status of municipal taxpayers in the federal courts. Doremus
involved a New Jersey state statute requiring "the reading, without
comment, of five verses of the Old Testament at the opening of each
public-school day."8 The Doremus plaintiffs challenged the statute as
"citizen[s]" and as "taxpayer[s]."9 Despite doubts about the
plaintiffs' standing, the New Jersey Supreme Court reached the
merits of the case and upheld the Garden State's statute under the
First Amendment.' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed,
holding that the citizen/plaintiff-taxpayers in Doremus had no "direct
and particular financial interest" affording them standing to challenge
the New Jersey law in the federal courts." The Doremus Court
quoted with approval Frothingham's observation that municipal
taxpayers have "direct and immediate" interests which give them
standing as such to challenge local outlays.32 However, state
taxpayers as such do not have standing in the federal courts to
challenge state statutes.
The Doremus taxpayers, like Mrs. Frothingham, did not contest
their particular tax liabilities. Rather, in this case also, the plaintiffs
asserted that their status as taxpayers enabled them to challenge state
statutes in the federal courts on constitutional grounds without
demonstrating individualized consequences unique to them. This,
Justice Jackson wrote, was not "a good-faith pocketbook action" in
which the plaintiffs "established the requisite special injury necessary
to a taxpayer's case or controversy."3
The teaching of Doremus is that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot
review state court decisions raising federal questions when the state
26. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
27. Justices Reed and Burton joined Justice Douglas in dissent. Id. at 435 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id. at 431.
30. Id. at 431-432.
31. Id. at 435 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,486 (1923)).
33. Id. at 434.
[Vol. 40:16 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Fall 2012] STATE TAXPAYER STANDING AFTER CUNO AND WINN
courts grant standing to a state taxpayer under rules more liberal than
the federal standing rules. Thus, after Frothingham and Doremus, a
clear set of guidelines governed taxpayer standing in the federal
courts: Absent a particularized claim specific to a federal or state
taxpayer, such a taxpayer lacks standing in the federal courts. In
contrast, a municipal taxpayer has standing to mount a generalized
challenge to municipal outlays or taxes in federal court by virtue of
his status as such a local taxpayer." When a state taxpayer like Mr.
Doremus establishes standing in the state courts to challenge under
the U.S. Constitution a state program or expenditure, the decision of
the state supreme court is final since the taxpayer lacks standing to
seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
In his Doremus dissent, Justice Douglas presaged two issues that
would subsequently recur in the Court's taxpayer standing
jurisprudence. Justice Douglas would have granted the Doremus
taxpayers standing since, if such taxpayers "were right in their
[Establishment Clause] contentions on the merits, they would
establish that their public schools were being deflected from the
educational program for which the taxes were raised."" This
observation foreshadows the Court's conclusion in Flast that
taxpayers as such, notwithstanding Frothingham, can have standing to
challenge congressional appropriations in the federal courts.
Moreover, Justice Douglas wrote, once New Jersey granted the
Doremus taxpayers standing, "the clash of interests [was] ... real
and ... strong."6 Consequently, there was a "case or controversy
within the meaning of Art[icle] III, [Section] 2 of the Constitution."
34. Of particular interest was Justice Jackson's characterization in Doremus of the
New Jersey court's decision as "advisory." Id. at 434. The import of this label is, at best,
unclear. The U.S. Supreme Court did not reverse or vacate the Doremus decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court. That state court decision on the merits, left intact by the U.S.
Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case, presumptively controls as a matter of stare
decisis in the future decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Flomerfelt v.
Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 463 (2010) (concurring opinion of LaVecchia, J.) ("That respect
for stare decisis is the simple, and sole, reason for my concurrence in the judgment
reached today."). Moreover, the Doremus decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
binds the lower New Jersey courts. Glaser v. Downes, 126 N.J. SUPER 10, 16 (1973) (New
Jersey trial court "is bound by the [state] Supreme Court decision in that case."). As the
U.S. Supreme Court later observed in ASARCO, state courts "possess the authority ... to
render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law."
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. §1738). It is
thus at best unclear what it means to characterize the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Doremus as "advisory."
35. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 435 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 436.
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Justice Douglas thereby framed the choices when a case arrives in the
high court from a state with a more liberal taxpayer standing rule
than the federal rule: To declare that there is no standing for federal
purposes in such a setting turns away from the courthouse parties
involved in a quite genuine "clash of interests" and leaves intact a
state court decision that the U.S. Supreme Court might have reversed
had it reached the merits.
B. Flast and the Promise of Broad Taxpayer Standing
A straightforward understanding of federal and state taxpayer
standing emerges from Forthingham and Doremus: There is none.
This bright line rule was subsequently upset in Flast v. Cohen," a
decision which purported to inaugurate an expansion of taxpayer
standing in the federal courts. In Flast, the Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding Frothingham, federal taxpayers had standing in the
federal courts to challenge under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment the expenditure of federal funds "to finance
instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious
schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials
for use in such schools."38
Writing for the Flast Court, Chief Justice Warren suggested that
Frothingham was unclear whether that decision "establishes a
constitutional bar to taxpayer suits or whether the [Frothingham]
Court was simply imposing a rule of self-restraint which was not
constitutionally compelled." 9 In constitutional terms, "the question
of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."40 Under this
Article III standard, the Chief Justice wrote, "[a] taxpayer may or
may not have the requisite personal stake in the outcome, depending
upon the circumstances of the case."" There is "no absolute bar in
Article III [of the U.S. Constitution] to suits by federal taxpayers
challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending
programs."" Rather, the relevant constitutional inquiry for standing
37. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
38. Id. at 85-86.
39. Id. at 92.
40. Id. at 101.
41. Id.
42. Id. Article III, § 1 of the Constitution describes "[t]he judicial Power" of the
federal courts in terms of "Cases" and "Controversies."
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purposes is whether under the particular circumstances "a federal
taxpayer will be deemed to have the personal stake and interest that
impart the necessary concrete adverseness" required by Article III
and its case and controversy requirement. 3
With that observation, the Chief Justice opened to taxpayer
standing the door Frothingham had closed: "[I]ndividuals who assert
only the status of federal taxpayers" may have standing in federal
court to "challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending
program" if "they can demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers
in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Article III [standing]
requirements.""
Chief Justice Warren then characterized taxpayer standing as
requiring two "nexuses" 4s: "a logical link between [taxpayer] status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked" and "a nexus between
[taxpayer] status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged."46 "When both nexuses are established, the
litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the
controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a
federal court's jurisdiction."47
Moving to the opinion's denouement, Chief Justice Warren
concluded that, under these tests, the Flast taxpayers had standing to
maintain their litigation in the federal courts since they contested "an
exercise by Congress of its power under Article I, Section 8, to spend
for the general welfare,"48 "the challenged program involve[d] a
substantial expenditure of federal tax funds," and the taxpayers
"alleged that the challenged expenditures violate[d] the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment."0
To discern the drafter's intent behind the First Amendment, the
Chief Justice invoked James Madison's "famous Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments"": "[Tihe same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
43. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 103.
46. Id. at 102.
47. Id. at 103.
48. Id. at 103. Art. I, Section 8, cl. 1 reads as follows: "The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States..."
49. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also RICHARD BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON 42 (2011).
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his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him
to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.""
From this vantage, the Chief Justice observed, the Establishment
Clause "operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the
exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by
Art[icle] I, [Section] 8.""
"[T]he taxpayer in Frothingham attacked a federal spending
program"5 4 and thereby established the first kind of nexus necessary
for taxpayer standing, i.e., "a logical link between [taxpayer] status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked."" However, Chief
Justice Warren continued, Mrs. Frothingham lacked the second form
of nexus necessary for taxpayer standing, as she alleged no breach of
"a specific limitation upon [Congress's] taxing and spending power.""
Rather, Mrs. Frothingham, as a federal taxpayer, asserted harm under
the less specific Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the Flast Court observed that the Establishment Clause
is not the only "specific ... limitation [on Congress's] taxing and
spending power. " In "future cases," federal taxpayers might have
standing to challenge federal spending under other "specific
limitations" in the U.S. Constitution." Chief Justice Warren thereby
indicated that Flast did not establish a limited standing rule for
taxpayers mounting Establishment Clause challenges to taxes and
spending. Rather, Flast opened the door as well to taxpayers
contesting taxes and spending under similarly "specific limitations" of
the Constitution.
In their concurrences, Justices Stewart and Fortas rejected this
broad approach. Justice Stewart understood Flast as recognizing
taxpayer standing "only [for] a federal taxpayer ... to assert that a
specific expenditure of federal funds violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."" Justice Fortas similarly would
have limited Flast to recognizing "the proposition that a taxpayer may
52. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 104.
54. Id. at 104-05.
55. Id.




60. Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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maintain a suit to challenge the validity of a federal expenditure on
the ground that the expenditure violates the Establishment Clause.61
As we shall see below, the restricted view of Flast advanced by
Justices Stewart and Fortas has ultimately prevailed over the broader
standing possibilities embraced by the Flast majority.
Dissenting alone in Flast, Justice Harlan critiqued virtually every
aspect of the Chief Justice's opinion, including the distinction
between the Establishment Clause (a sufficiently specific
constitutional limitation on congressional spending to buttress
taxpayer standing) and the Due Process Clause and the Tenth
Amendment (insufficiently specific to give Mrs. Frothingham such
standing). Rejecting this distinction, Justice Harlan asserted that
there is no "historical evidence that properly permits the Court to
distinguish, as it has here, among the Establishment Clause, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
limitations upon Congress'[s] taxing and spending powers."62 With
literary flare, Justice Harlan continued, "only in some Pickwickian
sense are any of the provisions with which the Court is concerned
'specific[ally]' limitations upon spending."63
Moreover, according to Justice Harlan, the taxpayers in Flast
asserted the kind of generalized grievances that are insufficient for
standing in the federal courts. "[Tjaxpayers' suits under the
Establishment Clause are not in these circumstances meaningfully
different from other public actions" in which the litigants seek to
advance the public interest rather than remedy individualized harm.'
The Flast
appellants challenge an expenditure, not a tax. Where no such
tax is involved, a taxpayer's complaint can consist only of an
allegation that public funds have been, or shortly will be,
expended for purposes inconsistent with the Constitution."
The interests he represents, and the rights he espouses,
are, as they are in all public actions, those held in common by
all citizens. To describe those rights and interests as personal,
61. Id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring). Professor Bittker, with his customary comic
flair, also criticized Flast. Boris I. Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal
Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 364 (1969).
62. Flast, 392 U.S. at 126.
63. Id. at 127.
64. Id. at 128.
65. Id.
11
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and to intimate that they are in some unspecified fashion to be
differentiated from those of the general public, reduces
constitutional standing to a word game played by secret
rules.'
"[P]ublic actions" like Flast, while "within the jurisdiction
conferred upon the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution
... might well alter the allocation of authority among the three
branches of the Federal Government."67
Justice Harlan's lonely Flast dissent would prove prescient as the
Court subsequently and awkwardly retreated from that decision's full
ramifications. At the time, however, Justice Harlan's arguments were
given the most credence by Justice Douglas who, in his separate
concurrence, drew the opposite inference from those arguments than
did Justice Harlan. Whereas Justice Harlan would have rejected
taxpayer standing in Flast on the basis of Frothingham, Justice
Douglas, invoking "the reasons stated by my Brother Harlan," would
have used Flast to get "rid of Frothingham here and now.""
Writing in support of "liberal"69 rules for taxpayer standing,
Justice Douglas stated that "[t]axpayers can be vigilant private
attorneys general" notwithstanding interests which are "de minimis
by financial standards."o Equally important is "the role that the
federal judiciary was designed to play in guarding basic rights against
majoritarian control."" Furthermore, "[t]here need be no inundation
of the federal courts if taxpayers' suits are allowed. There is a wise
judicial discretion that usually can distinguish between the frivolous
question and the substantial question ... "7 2
C. The Disorderly Post-Flast Retreat
While Chief Justice Warren's Flast opinion raised the possibility
of broad taxpayer standing in the federal courts, that possibility did
not materialize. Instead, the Court awkwardly retreated from the
expansive notion of federal taxpayer standing articulated in Flast,
ultimately limiting Flast to its particular facts, i.e., taxpayers'
66. Id. at 128-29.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 109 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 110.
72. Id. at 112.
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Establishment Clause challenges to congressional appropriations.
Throughout this awkward retreat, significant minorities of the Court
(often four justices) kept alive the promise of broader taxpayer
standing promised by Flast.
The disorderly retreat from a broader application of Flast started
with the Court's simultaneous decisions in United States v.
Richardson" and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War." In Richardson, a federal taxpayer asserted that the secrecy of
the Central Intelligence Agency's budget violates the constitutional
requirement of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 that "a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time." For himself and
four of his colleagues, Chief Justice Burger concluded that Mr.
Richardson "falls short of the standing criteria of Flast"" and instead
"neatly ... falls within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed" by
Flast, i.e., no standing for federal taxpayers suing without asserting
individualized harm.7 1 Mr. Richardson, unlike the plaintiff-taxpayers
in Flast, did not contest Congress's exercise of "the taxing and
spending power"" but, rather, attacked the statute that kept the
CIA's budget secret. "[T]here is," Chief Justice Burger reasoned, "no
'logical nexus' between the asserted status of taxpayer and the
claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a
more detailed report of the expenditures of" the CIA.' This claim
failed "the standards for taxpayer standing set forth in Flast"" since
the taxpayer merely sought "to employ a federal court as a forum in
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government."0
The taxpayer's inability to obtain information about the CIA's
budget is an alleged harm that is "plainly undifferentiated and
common to all members of the public."' In short, a five justice
majority concluded that Mr. Richardson lacked standing since "he has
not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any
73. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
74. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
75. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174.
76. Id. at 174-75.
77. Id. at 175.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of [the] statute"
which hides the CIA's expenditures from public view." If that
conclusion means that "no particular individual or class [can] litigate
these claims,"" that suggests that "the subject matter is committed to
the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.""
Justice Powell joined Chief Justice Burger's Richardson opinion
and also concurred separately to urge the Court to "lay to rest the
approach undertaken in Flast." 8 While he begrudgingly accepted
Flast as having "settled that federal taxpayer standing exists in
Establishment Clause cases,"" Justice Powell decried "the doctrinal
confusion inherent in the Flast two-part 'nexus' test."' "The lack of
real meaning and of principled content in the Flast 'nexus' test
renders it likely that it will in time collapse of its own weight."'
The four dissenters in Richardson produced three separate
opinions and demonstrated the continuing hold on a significant
minority of the Court of Flast's promise of broad taxpayer standing.
Justice Douglas reprised the theme, expressed in his Flast
concurrence, of judicial solicitude for claims like Mr. Richardson's:
Rather than being forced to pursue his inquiry politically through
Congress and the Executive branch, the courts should protect Mr.
Richardson's "stake in the integrity of constitutional guarantees
rather than turning him away without even a chance to be heard.""
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, contended that Mr.
Richardson had standing to litigate the "asserted duty" under Article
I, Section 9, Clause 7 because that alleged duty was "particularized,
palpable, and explicit."" Justice Brennan wrote a dissent covering
both Richardson and Schlesinger.1
Simultaneously with Richardson, Chief Justice Burger also wrote
for a six-justice majority in Schlesinger.' In that case, the plaintiffs, as
citizens and taxpayers, sued the Secretary of Defense and the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 179.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 180.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 184.
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id. at 204.
91. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,235 (1974).
92. Justice Stewart dissented in Richardson, but joined the majority in Schlesinger.
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secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Writing for the Court,
the Chief Justice held that these citizens and federal taxpayers lacked
standing as such to contend in federal court that "Article I, Section 6,
Clause 2 of the Constitution renders a member of Congress ineligible
to hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve during his
continuance in office." 3 As citizens, the Schlesinger plaintiffs merely
asserted an interest "held in common by all members of the public."4
In contrast, standing in federal court requires "[cloncrete" and
"particular injury,"" a "personal stake"" in the outcome of the
litigation.
Similarly, there was no taxpayer standing under Flast since the
plaintiffs "did not challenge an enactment under Art[icle] I, [Section]
8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting
Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status."'
Concurring separately, Justice Stewart, who favored taxpayer
standing in Richardson, distinguished Mr. Richardson from the
Schlesinger taxpayers on the ground that those taxpayers, unlike Mr.
Richardson, "do not allege that the petitioners" have refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed upon them by the
Constitution."" Justice Stewart also distinguished the Flast taxpayers
(who had standing) from the Schlesinger taxpayers (who did not) on
the ground that Flast only conferred standing if a taxpayer
"challenge[s]... an exercise of [Congress's] taxing and spending
power."'
Consistent with his Flast concurrence and his Richardson dissent,
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall, repudiated the notion of
standing altogether, dismissing standing, inter alia, as a doctrine which
''protects the status quo by reducing the challenges that may be made
to it and to its institutions" in federal court." Justice Brennan
93. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted). That clause of
the Constitution reads: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
94. Id. at 220.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 228.
98. Id. at 228-29 (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 229.
100. Id. at 229 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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contended that both the taxpayer in Richardson and the taxpayers in
Schlesinger "alleged injury in fact""' and thus had standing to sue.
Justice Marshall, writing for himself, claimed that the Schlesinger
taxpayer-plaintiffs possessed standing since they asserted "a claim of
direct and concrete injury to a judicially cognizable interest,"'02
namely, their right to lobby against the Vietnam War before
"Congressmen not subject to a conflict of interest by virtue of their
positions in the Armed Forces Reserves."',o
The divisive retreat from Flast's expansive view of taxpayer
standing continued in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc."" In that case, federal
taxpayers challenged on First Amendment grounds the free transfer
of surplus federal property to a nonprofit religious school. Unlike the
federal expenditure at issue in Flast, which was authorized by
Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the property
conveyance challenged in Valley Forge was authorized by Congress
under the Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.' For a five-justice majority, that distinction proved
controlling: Because the federal legislation authorizing the challenged
transfer "was an evident exercise of Congress' power under the
Property Clause,"" Flast did not apply. Moreover, unlike the Flast
taxpayers, the plaintiffs in Valley Forge challenged, not the
constitutionality of federal legislation, but an administrative "transfer
[of] a parcel of federal property."' 7 For these two reasons, the Valley
Forge taxpayers, unlike their Flast counterparts, lacked standing in
federal court.
Writing for the Valley Forge majority, then-Justice Rehnquist
characterized standing as "a blend of constitutional requirements and
prudential considerations."' 8 A key requirement for standing is that
the plaintiff allege "actual injury redressable by the court."" The
Valley Forge taxpayer-plaintiffs failed this test:
101. Id. at 237 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 239.
104. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464 (1982).
105. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. .
106. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480.
107. Id. at 479.
108. Id. at 471.
109. Id. at 473.
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The complaint in this case shares a common deficiency with
those in Schlesinger and Richardson. Although respondents
claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim
nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered
by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,
other than the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.
That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art.
III, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional
terms. It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State,
but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's
interest or the fervor of his advocacy. "[T]hat concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues," Baker
v. Carr, 396 U.S. at 204, is the anticipated consequence of
proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in fact;
it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury
itself.'
This restricted view of standing means that, in some potential
Establishment Clause situations, there will be no plaintiff with
standing to sue. "But the assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find
standing.",m
Reflecting the continuing adherence of many justices to the
broader taxpayer standing envisioned in Flast, Justice Brennan wrote
a Valley Forge dissent in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined.n2 Among his other objections, Justice Brennan identified an
issue which would be important both to the critics of Valley Forge
and to the Winn dissenters: fungibility."' "It can make no
110. Id. at 485-86
111. Id. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 227 (1974)).
112. Id. at 490.
113. See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Not Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to
Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NovO 1009, 1039 (2011)
(discussing Valley Forge and "the functional equivalence between grants of money and
grants of marketable property.") and id. at 1065-67 ("Government donations of valuable
resources (such as real property) to religion and grants of government funds to religion are
relatively fungible methods for providing religion with financial support. If one means is
prohibited by the Establishment Clause, the other ought to be equally so ... "); see also
Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing
17
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constitutional difference in the case before us whether the donation
to the petitioner here was in the form of a cash grant to build a facility
or in the nature of a gift of property including a facility already
built."" 4 The difference between cash and property, embraced by the
Valley Forge majority, "is a meaningless distinction.""'
Writing separately in dissent, Justice Stevens reiterated that, for
purposes of taxpayer standing, the fungibility of money and property
eroded the majority's distinction between them:
[The Court's] decision rests on the premise that the difference
between a disposition of funds pursuant to the Spending
Clause and a disposition of realty pursuant to the Property
Clause is of fundamental jurisprudential significance. With all
due respect, I am persuaded that the essential holding of Flast
v. Cohen attaches special importance to the Establishment
Clause and does not permit the drawing of a tenuous
distinction between the Spending Clause and the Property
Clause."'
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court found standing in a way that
confirmed Flast's increasingly limited ambit."' In Kendrick, federal
taxpayers mounted both facial and as-applied challenges to the
Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") under the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses."' No one disputed the taxpayers' standing
under Flast to challenge the AFLA facially."' The as-applied
challenge, the Court also held, fell squarely within "the narrow
exception [Flast] created to the general rule against taxpayer standing
established in Frothingham v. Mellon."'20 That is to say, the taxpayers
in Kendrick, like the taxpayers in Flast, contested under the
Establishment Clause a congressional exercise of the legislative
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 798 (2003) (criticizing Valley Forge for making "distinctions
[with Flast] that seemed hollow at best and insincere at worst ... [R]egardless of which
constitutional provision authorized Congress to spend public money-the Taxing and
Spending Clause or the Property Clause-the net result was exactly the same: a religious
institution benefitted from government largesse.").
114. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 511-12 (internal citation omitted).
115. Id. at 512.
116. Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
118. Id. at 597.
119. Id. 487 U.S. at 618.
120. Id.
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"taxing and spending power [under] Article I, [Section] 8, of the
Constitution.""' Because this challenge to the AFLA was
indistinguishable from the taxpayers' claims in Flast, the Kendrick
taxpayer-plaintiffs had standing to pursue this as-applied challenge in
the federal courts. However, writing for another five-justice majority,
then Chief Justice Rehnquist made clear that the broader possibilities
of Flast had been cabined by Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley
Forge.
For himself and three of his colleagues, Justice Blackmun
dissented on the merits, but agreed with the majority that the
Kendrick taxpayers had standing to sue in the federal courts.2 2 Thus,
the Kendrick Court, while narrowly divided on the underlying validity
of the taxpayers' claims, unanimously agreed that, per Flast, the
taxpayers as such had standing in federal court to pursue those claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court's final pre-Cuno case on taxpayer
standing was ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish.23 In ASARCO, Arizona state
taxpayers alleged in the state courts that "Arizona's statute governing
mineral leases on state lands" violated "the federal laws that
originally granted those lands from the United States to Arizona."'24
While the taxpayers' suit was filed against various state defendants,
the lessees, including ASARCO, were permitted to intervene as
defendants."' On the merits, the state taxpayers prevailed in the
Arizona courts.
On appeal from the Arizona Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the taxpayer-plaintiffs, who had standing in the
Arizona courts to challenge the Arizona statute, lack standing in the
federal courts per Frothingham and Doremus. In contrast to
municipal taxpayers who have a "direct and immediate" interest in
municipal revenues, state taxpayers are like federal taxpayers who,
to establish standing, must assert "personal injury" rather than
"generalized grievances" which are "purely abstract."127 The Arizona
taxpayers did not assert "the kind of particular, direct, and concrete
injury that is necessary to confer standing to sue in the federal
121. Id.
122. Id. at 630 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
124. Id. at 609.
125. Id. at 610.
126. Id. at 613 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487 (1923)).
127. Id. 615-16.
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courts."m8 It was "pure speculation" whether a taxpayer victory in
this case would have "result[ed] in any tax relief for respondents"
since the legislature could have responded to such a victory in a way
which denied the taxpayers "direct pecuniary relief."29 A legislature
can spend the money obtained for the state treasury by a taxpayer
lawsuit for what the legislature wants, rather than on the spending or
tax reduction the taxpayer-plaintiff seeks.'3" Thus, the ASARCO
plaintiffs flunked "the redressability prong of federal standing
requirements,"3' since an injunction invalidating the challenged
mineral leases would not necessarily cause a reduction of the
plaintiffs' tax burdens.
However, ASARCO and the other lessees had effectively lost in
the Arizona courts as intervening defendants. This loss invalidated
their leases by voiding the Arizona statute under which their leases
were issued. The decisions of the Arizona courts had thus imposed
upon these intervening defendants "specific" and "direct injury" by
nullifying their leases.3 2 This "distinct and palpable" injury gave the
lessee-defendants standing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court even
though the taxpayer-plaintiffs who started the lawsuit lacked standing
in the federal courts."' Moreover, the ASARCO Court observed,
failing to permit these defendant-lessees to appeal the adverse
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court would erode the principle
"that the binding application of federal law is uniform and ultimately
subject to control by [the U.S. Supreme] Court.""
When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where
plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under
the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise
our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court
causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who
petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or
controversy are also met.'35
128. Id. at 616.
129. Id. at 614.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 615.
132. Id. at 617-18.
133. Id. at 618 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975)) (internal
quotation marks deleted).
134. Id. at 622.
135. Id. at 623-24.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented on
the basis of Doremus: "[So far as Article III standing is concerned,"', 6
the relevant inquiry is the injury alleged by the plaintiffs when they
sue, not the injury to the defendants when they lose. "[A~ll that the
[Supreme] Court has before it in the present case" are plaintiffs with
"a generalized grievance about governmental action."' 1  Moreover,
the inability of the U.S. Supreme Court, in situations like ASARCO,
to review state court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution is "a
largely imaginary problem."'3 In particular, the Chief Justice noted,
"[s]ome state courts render advisory decisions on federal law of no
binding force even within the State" and this practice has not proved
troublesome."'
In short, over dissent, the ASARCO Court affirmed and
elaborated Doremus. While state taxpayers cannot challenge state
policies in the federal courts, particular beneficiaries of those policies,
like the ASARCO lessees, having lost in the state courts, have
standing if they can get the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
To summarize: On the eve of Cuno, the taxpayer standing case
law of the U.S. Supreme Court manifested a circuitous pattern of
negation, followed by expansion, and then disorderly retreat. By the
time of ASARCO, the Court, over significant and continuing dissent,
had pulled back from the broader implications of Flast, returning
toward the earlier restrictions of Frothingham and Doremus: Absent
particularized injury, federal taxpayers have no standing to pursue
generalized claims in the federal courts except in situations
corresponding to Flast, namely, Establishment Clause challenges to
congressional exercises of its tax and spending powers. The same rule
applied to state taxpayers challenging state taxation and
expenditures, though certain defendants might be able to overturn in
the U.S. Supreme Court taxpayer victories in the state courts if those
defendants are injured by state court decisions obtained by the
taxpayers. In contrast, a municipal taxpayer has standing to challenge
municipal taxes and outlays in the federal courts even in the absence
of individualized harm.
136. Id. at 635 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 636.
138. Id. at 637.
139. Id. at 636. See also Jonathan D. Persky, Note, "Ghosts That Slay": A
Contemporary Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN L. REV. 1155 (2005) (discussing
historical and current practice of state advisory opinions).
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However, through ASARCO, the prospect of broader taxpayer
standing articulated in Flast was kept alive by a strong current of
dissent. In both Valley Forge and Richardson, four-justice minorities
would have found taxpayer standing. There was also significant
dissent in Schlesinger (where the dissenting justices would have found
taxpayer standing) and in ASARCO (where they would not).
III. Cuno and Winn
A. Cuno
Against this disorderly background, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno."o In Cuno, a unanimous Court
made clear that the retreat from a broader application of Flast was
complete. Along with Winn, Cuno definitively terminated the
broader possibilities of taxpayer standing envisioned in Flast and kept
alive in post-Flast dissent.
The provenance of Cuno can be understood in three mutually
compatible ways. First, Cuno was a classic public interest lawsuit. As
many commentators have noted, Ralph Nader played a critical role in
stimulating the Cuno litigation.'41
Second, Cuno was also a response to the (quite accurate)
perceptions that corporations have become adept at extracting state
and local tax benefits, and that state and municipal officials have
grown increasingly prone to grant such benefits. The upshot has been
a prisoner's dilemma in which public officials opposing corporate tax
benefits feel they must offer them to remain competitive in the face of
the tax benefits extended to corporations by other states and
localities.142 As a consequence of this interjurisdictional competition,
140. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
141. See, e.g., Morgan J. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, Community Efforts to
Attract and Retain Corporations: Legal and Policy Implications of State and Local Tax
Incentives and Eminent Domain: The Post-Cuno Litigation Landscape, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2008) (describing the role of "consumer activist Ralph Nader"); Matt
Kitchen, The Ohio Investment Tax Credit: Impermissible Burden or Necessary Benefit?
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1685, 1686 (2005) ("Consumer advocate
Ralph Nader had been looking for a test case to challenge the constitutionality of state
investment tax credits (ITCs)."); Bradford C. Spencer, Evaluating Kentucky's Investment
Tax Credits in Light of Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 94 KY. L.J. 161, 165 n.26
(2005)("The [Cuno] plaintiffs were a group of homeowners and small businesses who were
encouraged to file suit by Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law.").
142. Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Personal (and
Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1145, 1149-50 (2008).
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state and local tax bases have eroded and local tax rates have risen in
light of diminished tax bases.143
Finally, Cuno manifests the belief of important commentators in
the robust application of the dormant Commerce Clause's
nondiscrimination principle. The lead attorney for the Cuno
plaintiffs, Professor Peter Enrich, had attracted Nader's attention
through an article in which Enrich argues that the prisoner's dilemma
posed by state and local tax competition for industry can be resolved
through the courts' invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause.4
While others are skeptical of this claim on the legal merits,145 Enrich's
article reflects the optimistic outlook of prominent dormant
Commerce Clause commentators that the nondiscrimination principle
articulated under that clause can play a coherent and constructive
role in policing state taxes.146
The underlying facts of Cuno were straightforward and typical:
"[T]o induce [DaimlerChrysler] to remain in Toledo, Ohio," 47 the
City of Toledo and two local school districts extended to
DaimlerChrysler a package of property tax exemptions authorized by
143. Id.at 1145.
144. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives For Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 396 (1996) ("the
states find themselves caught in a classic prisoners' dilemma.").
145. 1 was among the doctrinal skeptics in light of the fungibility of tax benefits, cash
grants and in-kind subsidies. Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 37
STATE TAX NOTES 859 (2005), reprinted at 108 TAX NOTES 1569 (2005); Edward A.
Zelinsky Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A Critique, 34 STATE TAX NOTES 37 (2004), reprinted
at 105 TAX NOTES 225 (2004).
146. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) is the most commonly
cited authority for the proposition that state taxes may not discriminate against interstate
commerce. For more on Complete Auto, see Walter Hellerstein, Kirk J. Stark, John Swain
& Joan M. Youngman, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION (9th
ed. 2009) 119-20; Richard D. Pomp & Oliver Oldman, 1 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
1-19 (5th ed. 2005).
There has been much interesting debate on the viability of the dormant
Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle. For the views of prominent proponents,
see Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-Self-
Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541
(2010); Brannon P. Denning, Is The Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable? A Response
to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.. 623 (2007); Brannon P. Denning & Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on
Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 196 (2007). For my contrary views, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Incoherence of Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination:
A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J, 653 (2007).
147. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio, West. Div.
2001).
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Ohio law.'48 In addition, for its new investment in a Toledo plant,
DaimlerChrysler received a tax credit against its Ohio franchise tax
liability."'9 The Cuno plaintiffs originally challenged these tax
provisions in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.'" The
defendants removed the litigation to the federal District Court which
rejected the plaintiffs' subsequent motion to remand the case back to
the Ohio state courts."' Ironically in light of subsequent events, the
Cuno plaintiffs argued for remand, inter alia, on the ground that, as
state taxpayers, their claim to standing was stronger in the Ohio
courts than in the federal courts.'52 On the merits, the District Court
ruled that the state tax credit and the municipal property tax
exemption violated neither Equal Protection nor the dormant
Commerce Clause.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's Equal Protection conclusions as well as
the trial court's approval of the municipal property exemption under
the Commerce Clause.' However, in a dramatic ruling (at least to
Commerce Clause mavens), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Ohio investment tax credit failed muster under the dormant
Commerce Clause. This ruling engendered enormous controversy'5 4
and, ultimately, a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court."'
The high court, however, did not address the merits of the case
but, rather, unanimously dismissed Cuno"" on the grounds that the
plaintiffs, as state taxpayers, lacked standing in the federal courts to
challenge Ohio's state investment tax credits-even though it was the
defendants who insisted on the removal of the case from the state
courts."' There was in Cuno none of the dissent which had occurred
148. Id. (citing OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.62(C)(1) and 5709.631).
149. Id. (citing OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33).
150. Cuno, 154 F. Supp.2d at 1198.
151. Id. at 1201-04.
152. The plaintiffs' position ultimately proved correct. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339 (2006).
153. 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
154. As I observe in notes 142 and 145, supra, as a matter of tax policy, I agree with
the concerns raised by the Cuno plaintiffs but disagree with their dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. A useful excellent compendium of Cuno commentary is Kristin E.
Hickman & Sarah L. Bunce, Symposium: DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 15 (2006).
155. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005) (granting certiorari).
156. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
157. Id. at 342 n.3.
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in Valley Forge, Richardson, and Schlesinger and which kept alive the
broader standing possibilities raised in Flast. Joined by seven of his
colleagues,"' Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the no-taxpayer-
standing rule of Forthingham, affirmed in these later decisions,
applies, not only "to taxpayer challenges to expenditures that deplete
the treasury,"'" but as well "to taxpayer challenges to so-called 'tax
expenditures,' which reduce amounts available to the treasury by
granting tax credits or exemptions."'"
The injury asserted by the Cuno taxpayers is inadequate for
standing in the federal courts because such injury is not "concrete and
particularized," but rather constitutes a generalized grievance shared
"in common with people generally.""' Moreover, for two reasons,
such taxpayer injury is "conjectural or hypothetical."'" Challenged
tax benefits might actually augment "government revenues" by
"spur[ring] economic activity."' 6 This possibility belies any harm to
the fisc and its taxpayers. Moreover, even if the elimination of a
challenged tax benefit increases tax collections, the plaintiff-taxpayer
has no right to insist that the resulting revenues be used to reduce his
taxes or to "bolster ... programs that benefit him."'" Thus, the Cuno
plaintiffs, as taxpayers, failed to assert injury "redressabl[e]" by an
injunction against the Ohio tax credit.6 Per Doremus and ASARCO,
this "rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies with
undiminished force to state taxpayers"'" such as the Cuno plaintiffs.
Affording such taxpayers the opportunity in federal court to
challenge state "tax and spending provisions" is "contrary to the . . .
modest role Article III envisions for federal courts."67
To establish standing in the federal courts, the Cuno taxpayer-
plaintiffs argued that their dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
Ohio's investment tax credit was analogous to the Establishment
Clause claim asserted by the Flast taxpayer-plaintiffs. Chief Justice
158. See Justice Ginsburg's separate concurrence, Id. at 354 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
This concurrence is discussed infra at notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 343.
160. Id. at 343-44.
161. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 344-345.
165. Id. at 344.
166. Id. at 345.
167. Id. at 346.
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Roberts characterized this argument as "misguided"" since
taxpayers' rights "under the Commerce Clause ... are fundamentally
unlike the[ir] right[s]"" under the Establishment Clause:
[S]uch a broad application of Flast's exception to the general
prohibition on taxpayer standing would be quite at odds with
its narrow application in our precedent and Flast's own
promise that it would not transform federal courts into forums
for taxpayers' generalized grievances.'
The Cuno plaintiffs attempted in two ways to buttress their
standing as state taxpayers by means of their standing as municipal
taxpayers."' First, the taxpayer-plaintiffs asserted that the investment
tax credit extended to DaimlerChrysler, by diminishing Ohio's
revenues, left less state revenue available to distribute as state aid to
municipalities. Thus, the state income tax credit hurt the Cuno
plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers by diminishing state assistance to
localities.
Rejecting this argument, the Chief Justice observed that this
argument assumes that, if the Court invalidated Ohio's investment tax
credit, "the state government will choose to direct the supposed
revenue from the restored franchise tax to municipalities. This is
precisely the sort of conjecture we may not entertain in assessing
standing.,"' That is to say, the additional revenues potentially
obtained by the judicial invalidation of Ohio's investment credit
might be used by the legislature for other state spending or to reduce
other state taxes, rather than being directed to the Buckeye State's
localities.
The Cuno plaintiffs' second effort "to leverage"'73 their standing
as municipal taxpayers invoked the rule "that federal-question
jurisdiction over a claim may authorize a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over state-law claims that may be viewed as part of the
same case because they derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact as the federal claim.""' From this vantage, the plaintiffs'
168. Id. at 347.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. at 349.
172. Id. at 350.
173. Id. at 349.
174. Id. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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challenge to the municipal property tax exemption (a federal question
because the plaintiffs have federal standing as local taxpayers) allows
the federal courts "to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" over the
plaintiffs' challenge to the Ohio state income tax credit."'
For the Court, Chief Justice Roberts said "no": Federal courts do
not have "supplemental jurisdiction"" absent "constitutional
standing""7 -which the Cuno plaintiffs lacked as state taxpayers
merely asserting generalized grievances:
Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III injury with respect to
their state taxes, and even if they did do so with respect to
their municipal taxes, that injury does not entitle them to seek
a remedy as to the state taxes ... [S]tanding is not dispensed
in gross.17
Concurring, Justice Ginsburg described the denial of federal
taxpayer standing to the Cuno plaintiffs as "solidly grounded" in
Frothingham and Doremus.'7 1 She also indicated that, despite her
reservations about other standing cases including Valley Forge, she
"accept[s] ... the nonjusticiability of Frothingham-type federal and
state taxpayer suits in federal court . . .
Cuno extinguished the current of dissent found in earlier post-
Flast decisions. Concurring separately, Justice Ginsburg also returned
the Court's standing doctrine back to its restrictive roots in
Frothingham and Doremus. Cuno thus definitively closed the door to
the broader taxpayer standing possibilities articulated by Flast and
kept alive by post-Flast dissent.
It is instructive to identify, in the context of Cuno, what
Professor Rahdert has aptly called the roads not taken.' In light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cuno, the Cuno plaintiffs'
argument to the District Court was correct: The case should have
been remanded to the state courts, given the absence of federal
taxpayer standing. Assuming that the Cuno litigation had progressed
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 352.
178. Id. at 353 (Ginsburg, J, concurring) (internal citations and quotation marks
deleted).
179. Id. at 354.
180. Id. at 355.
181. Rahdert, supra, note 113.
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through the Ohio state courts, ASARCO indicates that, had the Cuno
taxpayers lost in the Ohio courts, they would have lacked standing to
press further. However, DaimlerChrysler (like the ASARCO lessees)
would have had standing, had it lost in the Ohio courts, to apply for
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Had the Cuno plaintiffs wanted
to be in federal court, they could have pressed in federal court their
Equal Protection and dormant Commerce Clause claims against the
municipal property tax exemption while leaving the state tax credit
for separate litigation in the state courts. As I argue below, this
possibility is today an historic anomaly since the State of Ohio was
intimately involved in the municipal property tax exemption extended
to DaimlerChrysler.
B. Winn
In Winn, Arizona taxpayers mounted an Establishment Clause
challenge to Arizona's income "tax credits for contributions to school
tuition organizations, or STOs. STOs use these contributions to
provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of
which are religious."" These Arizona taxpayers claimed standing
under Flast and its rule that taxpayers who might otherwise lack
standing nevertheless have the right to challenge in the federal courts
government outlays which violate the Establishment Clause."'
Writing five years after Cuno for a five-justice majority, Justice
Kennedy rejected this standing claim, holding that Flast grants
taxpayers standing in federal court only to contest cash
appropriations under the Establishment Clause, not to challenge tax
benefits such as the Arizona tax credits.
Justice Kennedy started Winn with familiar themes from the
Court's standing case law. Article III of the Constitution limits the
federal courts' power to resolving "Cases" and "Controversies.""
This limitation is integral to "[t]he concept and operation of the
separation of powers."'. "To state a case or controversy under
Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing. . . [which] requir[es] a
particular injury."'" Citing Frothingham, Doremus, Cuno, ASARCO
and the Court's post-Cuno decision in Hein,'" the Winn Court
182. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1440 (2011).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1441
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1442.
187. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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declared that the general "rule against taxpayer standing, a rule
designed both to avoid speculation and to insist on particular injury,
applies to respondents' lawsuit."
The obvious exception to this rule, invoked by the taxpayer-
plaintiffs, is Flast. The Winn plaintiffs argued that the Arizona "tax
credit is, for Flast purposes, best understood as a governmental
expenditure,"'" Thus, as Arizona taxpayers, they had standing to
challenge the credit on Establishment Clause grounds. However,
Justice Kennedy wrote, "[t]hat is incorrect.'"
It is easy to see that tax credits and governmental
expenditures can have similar economic consequences, at least
for beneficiaries whose tax liability is sufficiently large to take
full advantage of the credit. Yet tax credits and governmental
expenditures do not both implicate individual taxpayers in
sectarian activities. A dissenter whose tax dollars are
extracted and spent knows that he has in some small measure
been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of
conscience. In that instance the taxpayer's direct and
particular connection with the establishment does not depend
on economic speculation or political conjecture. The
connection would exist even if the conscientious dissenter's
tax liability were unaffected or reduced. When the
government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is no
such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged
establishment. Any financial injury remains speculative. And
awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to
retain control over their own funds in accordance with their
own consciences.
Justice Kennedy's first observation in this passage-the "similar
economic consequences" of tax credits and cash outlays for those
receiving them-is today common ground. Consider, for example, an
Arizona taxpayer who, before taking any tax credit, owes the state
treasury $1,000 in income taxes. Suppose that Arizona either gives
this taxpayer a credit of $200 against his tax liability or, alternatively,
collects the $1,000 in tax but simultaneously mails the taxpayer a cash
188. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1444-45.
189. 131 S.Ct. at 1447.
190. Id.
191. Id. (internal quotation and citations deleted).
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grant of $200. Today, largely as a result of the influence of tax
expenditure analysis, it is widely accepted that, under either
alternative, the result from the taxpayer's perspective is the same
because of the fungibility of money.' Whether the state collects $800
in tax net of the $200 credit or collects $1,000 in tax and then returns
$200 as a cash grant, the taxpayer makes a net payment to the state of
$800. As Justice Kennedy observed, the credit and the cash grant
produce the same final financial result for the taxpayer.
It is at the next stage in his analysis that Justice Kennedy entered
contested waters. Consider now two Arizona taxpayers, A and B,
both of whom owe $1,000 in income taxes but only one of whom, B,
will receive either a $200 grant or a $200 tax credit from the state.
Suppose further that the grant or credit rewards activity by B to
which A objects. If Arizona's assistance to B takes the form of a $200
grant, Justice Kennedy concludes that some small fraction of that
$200 is attributable to A's tax payment. This is Madison's "three
pence," a small, but cognizable, subsidy from A's tax payment to B. 93
Hence, A has standing under Flast to challenge this grant under the
Establishment Clause.
If, however, Arizona gives B a tax credit rather than a cash grant,
Justice Kennedy concludes, none of the $200 credit has any
"connection" with A's tax payment. The credit, according to Justice
Kennedy, merely "allows [B] to retain control over [her] own
funds . .. Any financial injury [to A] remains speculative."194
Underlying this conclusion is the premise that, if Arizona were
forbidden from offering the credit to B, the Arizona legislature might
use the resulting revenues of $200 for purposes other than reducing
A's taxes. The legislature might instead use that $200 to fund other
programs or to reduce taxes for taxpayers other than A. Thus, there
is no "connection" between A's taxes and B's credit. This thought
192. The literature on tax expenditure analysis is voluminous. For two recent
contributions, compare Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How
Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1
(2010) with J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. and Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010). See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and the
Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25
(2011); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
VA. TAX REV. 797 (2005).
193. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
194. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1447.
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has a strong provenance in the earlier standing case law and has often
been articulated by the Court under the heading of "redressability.""'
If, on the other hand, one concludes that the Arizona legislature
would respond to the judicial invalidation of the challenged credit by
reducing A's state tax liability or if one concludes (as do the Winn
dissenters) that that legislative response is irrelevant, then the
analogy between the Winn situation and Flast becomes stronger. This
issue divides the Winn majority from the dissenters, i.e., the
willingness to assume the response of the Arizona legislature to the
invalidation of the challenged tax credit and to conclude that this
assumed response is relevant the issue of standing.
To buttress the distinction for standing purposes between a cash
grant and a tax credit, Justice Kennedy noted that, "[w]hen Arizona
taxpayers contribute to STOs, they spend their own money, not
money the State has collected from respondents or from other
taxpayers."' This observation highlights another disagreement
between the Winn majority and the dissenters who would instead
characterize STO contributors as receiving from the Arizona treasury
a matching grant for their contributions in the form of the tax credit.
As Justice Kennedy noted, the Court's standing case law has
often been framed in terms of "causation and redressability."'" Since
STO contributors are donating their own funds, "any injury the
[taxpayers] may suffer [are not] fairly traceable to the government.""
Moreover, an injunction proscribing Arizona's tax credits "would not
affect noncontributing taxpayers or their tax payments." In short
"what matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs receive
government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that moneys
have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious
institution in violation of the citizens' conscience. Under that inquiry,
respondents' argument fails."'" The Winn dissenters dismiss this
"extract[ion]"-based analysis as privileging form over economic
substance.20
In his final theme in Winn, Justice Kennedy noted the apparent
"tension" 20' between, on the one hand, the conclusion that the Winn
195. See, e.g., DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006).
196. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1448.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1450.
201. Id. at 1448.
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taxpayers lack standing to challenge the Arizona tax credit in the
federal courts and, on the other, such decisions as Mueller v. Allen;2 2
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist;203
Hunt v. McNair;" and Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New
York."' In these cases, taxpayers were permitted to challenge state
income tax deductions (Mueller, Nyquist), municipal property tax
exemptions (Walz) and a state's issuance of tax-favored bonds
(Hunt).
To the extent these cases permitted taxpayers to challenge tax
benefits under the Establishment Clause without asserting
individualized harm, these cases, Justice Kennedy concluded,
represent "nonbinding sub silentio holdings" which "left [the standing
issue] unexplored."206 Moreover, "the plaintiffs in those cases could
have advanced arguments for jurisdiction independent of Flast..."'20
Thus, for Justice Kennedy and his four colleagues, "the case-or-
controversy limitation on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III"
denies the Arizona taxpayers standing to challenge the income tax
credit offered by the Grand Canyon State.208
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote briefly and
separately in the spirit of Justice Harlan's Flast dissent. 209 Justice
Scalia joined the Court's Winn opinion which distinguishes Flast as
affording standing only to taxpayers who challenge direct cash outlays
(rather than tax benefits). However, the ultimate solution, Justice
Scalia argued, is to recognize that "Flast is an anomaly," a "misguided
decision" which should be "repudiate[d].""0
In contrast, for herself and three of her dissenting colleagues,
Justice Kagan embraced Flast and asserted that the Winn majority
"breaks from ... precedent" by denying the plaintiff/taxpayers
standing to challenge the Arizona tax credit for contributions to
STOs.21 1 Moreover, the Winn majority's distinction between cash
grants (which taxpayers can challenge in federal court on
202. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
203. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
204. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
205. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).




210. Id. at 1450.
211. Id.
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Establishment Clause grounds) and tax credits (which they cannot) is
unprincipled.
The novel distinction in standing law between appropriations and
tax expenditures has as little basis in principle as it has in our
precedent. Cash grants and targeted tax breaks are means of
accomplishing the same government objective-to provide financial
support to select individuals or organizations. Taxpayers who
oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to protest whether that
aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other. Either way, the
government has financed the religious activity. And so either way,
taxpayers should be able to challenge the subsidy."'
Tax benefits and direct outlays are fungible; "the government
can easily substitute one for the other."2 13 "From now on, the
government need follow just one simple rule-subsidize through the
tax system-to preclude taxpayer challenges to state funding of
religion."214 Thus, Winn, Justice Kagan concludes, is "the effective
demise of taxpayer standing."21
As I discuss below, for two reasons, this overstates the impact of
Winn. First, municipal taxpayers still have standing in the federal
courts to challenge local taxes and expenditures.
Second, taxpayers typically have standing to challenge state taxes
in the state courts under more liberal standing rules. Thus, Cuno and
Winn will shift litigation to the state courts rather than stop such
litigation altogether.
Amplifying her theme that the Winn majority ignored precedent,
Justice Kagan declared that "all agree" that there is a "general
prohibition on taxpayer standing."216 This broad statement indicates
greater consensus on the Court than the 5-4 vote in Winn might
suggest. Indeed, this broad statement heralds the end of the retreat
from Flast. The dissenting themes articulated earlier in the Court's
history (abolish taxpayer standing, extend taxpayer standing more
broadly beyond Establishment Clause challenges) are indeed now
history. According to Justice Kagan, Flast today is a narrow
"exception to the rule" of no-taxpayer-standing, an exception which




215. Id at 1451.
216. Id.
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Establishment Clause."217 Thus, the Fortas-Stewart interpretation of
Flast as limited to Establishment Clause challenges has prevailed over
the more expansive standing possibilities which were presaged
(incorrectly as it now turns out) by the Flast majority and which, until
Cuno and Winn, were kept alive by post-Flast dissent. Today, "all
agree" that there is a "general prohibition on taxpayer standing."
Frothingham and its narrow conception of taxpayer standing again
controls.
Turning to the facts of Winn, Justice Kagan contended that
"[flinding standing here is merely a matter of applying Flast."218
Invoking the doctrine of tax expenditure analysis,' Justice Kagan
argued that Justice Kennedy's "distinction [between cash grants and
tax benefits] finds no support in case law, and just as little in
reason."220  "Taxpayers experience the same injury for standing
purposes whether government subsidization of religion takes the form
of a cash grant or a tax measure." 2
Moreover, "for a simple reason," the Court has been correct in
the past to treat appropriations and tax expenditures as both giving
rise to taxpayer standing under Flast.222 "Here, as in many contexts,
the distinction [between cash grants and tax incentives] is one in
search of a difference." 23  "[A] subsidy is a subsidy."2 4 From this
vantage, the concern the Court has called "redressability" does not
matter: It is of no moment how the Arizona legislature might respond
(or not) to the judicial invalidation of the STO tax credit. That credit
is indistinguishable from an equivalent cash grant; both channel
public largesse from the taxpayers to the recipient. Indeed, Justice
Kagan argued, the federal tax expenditure budget and the tax
expenditure budgets of the various states (including Arizona) reflect
the fact that tax benefits and cash grants "result in the same bottom
line."225 Consequently, taxpayers' "access to the federal courts should
not depend on which type of financial subsidy the State has
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1452.
219. Id. I am skeptical of the constitutionalization of tax expenditure analysis. Edward
A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis,




223. Id. at 1455.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1457.
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offered."226 Under the Winn majority's opinion, "form prevails over
substance, and differences that make no difference determine access
to the Judiciary. And the casualty is a historic and vital method of
enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of religious neutrality."227
For Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues, "[t]he injury to
taxpayers that Flast perceived arose whenever the legislature used its
taxing-and-spending power to channel tax dollars to religious
activities." 28  From this vantage, it does not matter for standing
purposes whether the expenditure of a particular public dollar can be
traced back to the plaintiff/taxpayer, or whether the challenged
expenditure occurs through the tax system or by means of cash
spending, or whether the invalidation of a challenged tax benefit
would reduce the plaintiff's individual tax burden. In the
Establishment Clause context, per Flast, "[tiaxpayers have
standing ... despite their foreseeable failure to show that the alleged
constitutional violation involves their own tax dollars, not because the
State has used their particular funds."29
Because, under the majority's opinion, tax expenditures do not
give rise to taxpayer standing, Justice Kagan concluded, "the
government may violate the Establishment Clause [but] taxpayers
cannot gain access to the federal courts" to challenge such a
violation.2' However, as I discuss further below, this is not quite
right as municipal taxpayers still have standing to challenge municipal
policies and practices in the federal courts.
In short, Cuno and Winn complete the retreat from the broader
standing possibilities raised in Flast and kept alive in post-Flast
dissent. Particularly instructive is Justice Kagan's Winn dissent which
makes clear that the Roberts Court is today divided on the relatively
narrow question whether Flast authorizes taxpayer standing for
Establishment Clause challenges to tax benefits. Even the Winn
dissenters have now abandoned the broader standing possibilities
raised by Flast. Frothingham, Doremus and their no-taxpayer-
standing rule again control.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1458.
228. Id. at 1459.
229. Id. at 1460.
230. Id. at 1462.
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III. State Taxpayer Standing in the State Courts
The states' taxpayer standing rules are generally more liberal
than the federal approach which, after Cuno and Winn, unreservedly
bars standing to federal and state taxpayers.23' Some states recognize
taxpayer standing in cases deemed by the courts to be particularly
important. Other states grant taxpayer standing more broadly,
without first assessing the significance vel non of any particular case.
Often, the state courts characterize either of these approaches as
"waiving" the requirement of standing for taxpayers. Some states'
taxpayer standing rules are exclusively judge-made. In other states,
statutes authorize taxpayer suits to challenge state or municipal
expenditures. The states' standing case law and statutes frequently
link taxpayer status to citizen status. Under all of these variations,
state taxpayers challenging state taxes and outlays have greater access
to the state courts than to the federal courts because, via case law,
statutes, or both, the states generally look more favorably on taxpayer
standing than do the federal courts.
A. State Taxpayer Standing for Important Cases
Arizona is among the states which grant taxpayer standing for
cases deemed to be of particular importance. In ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish, Arizona taxpayers successfully challenged in the state courts
an Arizona statute under which Arizona had granted mineral leases
to various mining companies.2 32 While the U.S. Supreme Court held
that these Arizona taxpayers lacked standing in the federal courts,
these state taxpayers had been allowed to litigate in the courts of the
Grand Canyon State."
In its decision before ASARCO reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Arizona Supreme Court did not discuss the standing of the
plaintiff/taxpayers. Rather, Arizona's highest court took that
standing for granted, declaring that "[t]he individual petitioners are
taxpayers who allege that their taxes support public education in
Arizona."2 4 On that basis, the Arizona court adjudicated the
taxpayers' claims against the state statute governing mineral leases.
231. To reiterate the point made in footnote 6, supra, we do not have a convenient
phrase to distinguish between a taxpayer's standing to challenge individually his own
particular tax liability and a taxpayer's standing to challenge taxes and outlays more
generally. It is the latter sense in which this Article uses the phrase "taxpayer standing."
232. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
233. Id.
234. Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dep't, 747 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ariz. 1987).
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Sixteen years later, in Bennett v. Napolitano, the Arizona
Supreme Court explicitly addressed the status of taxpayer standing
under Arizona law. In Bennett, four leaders of the Arizona
legislature challenged the constitutionality of the governor's use of
her item veto." Belatedly, the four legislators claimed standing as
Arizona taxpayers in addition to their standing as legislators.236 The
Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim of taxpayer standing in a
fashion which confirmed a more liberal approach in cases determined
to be particularly important.
The plaintiff/legislators in Bennett cited Ethington v. Wright to
support their standing as Arizona taxpayers.237 However, the Bennett
Court distinguished Ethington on the grounds that "Ethington
allowed a taxpayer to challenge a legislative act that expended monies
for an unconstitutional purpose."" In contrast, the
legislator/taxpayers in Bennett challenged the manner in which the
governor deployed her veto power.29
The Bennett Court stated that Arizona's standing rules are not
constitutionally required, but rather reflect "prudential concerns."4
"'[I]n exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving issues of
great public importance that are likely to recur,"' the Court will
"'waive[] the standing requirement."'2 4 1 Bennett, the Court decided,
was not such a case of "exceptional" significance justifying waiver of
the standing requirement for state taxpayers.242
Bennett implicitly indicates that, in retrospect, ASARCO was
"the rare case in which waiver of standing is proper."243 Thus, unlike
the federal courts, which define standing as the sine qua non of the
right to sue in those courts, the Arizona courts characterize standing
as a prudential requirement which the courts may forgo in important
cases, thereby permitting taxpayers like the ASARCO plaintiffs to sue
in their capacities as taxpayers.
235. 81 P.3d 311, 313 (Ariz. 2003).
236. Id. at 318. ("The 'taxpayer' argument was first raised in petitioners' reply
brief...").
237. Etherington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948).
238. Bennett, 81 P.3d at 318.
239. Id. at 313.
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998)).
242. Id. at 320.
243. Id. at 318.
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The standing tests articulated by the Alaska courts are similar:
"To establish citizen-taxpayer standing, a litigant must show that the
issues raised are of public significance and that it is an appropriate
litigant to seek adjudication of those issues."" Applying these
criteria, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "[a] non-profit public
interest law firm" lacked standing "to establish constitutional
standards that must be met before compelling minors to take
psychotropic medications"2 45 since the minors themselves "would be
the appropriate litigant[s]."2 " However, in a case similar to
ASARCO, "a coalition of environmental, Native, and fishing
groups"" did have citizen-taxpayer standing to challenge Alaska's
"mineral leasing system."a
In Godfrey v. State, the Iowa Supreme Court declared that
"Iowa, like many states, essentially follows the federal doctrine on
standing."249 Nevertheless, Iowa will grant standing to "citizens who
seek to resolve certain questions of great public importance and
interest in our system of government." 25 0 Ms. Godfrey, who claimed
standing "as a citizen, taxpayer, and a potential workers'
compensation claimant,". "failed to present an issue of great public
importance."25 2 Consequently, the Iowa court was not "convince[d
that it] should waive the requirement of standing" for her.13
However, the Godfrey Court made clear that, in appropriate cases,
such waivers will be forthcoming for taxpayers raising questions "of
great public importance."4
To the same effect is the decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court in ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County,." ATC South, Inc.
("ATC") challenged a favorable zoning change granted to a
competitor2 6 The court rejected ATC's claim to taxpayer standing.2
244. Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State, 239 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Alaska
2010).
245. Id. at 1253.
246. Id. at 1256.
247. Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska 1987).
248. Id. at 327.
249. 752 N.W.2d 413,424 (Iowa 2008).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 417.
252. Id. at 428.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 669 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 2008).
256. Id. at 339.
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Under South Carolina law, "general standing requirements" will be
waived when a plaintiff raises "an issue [I of such public importance
as to require its resolution for future guidance."' ATC flunked this
test and therefore lacked standing to pursue its litigation.259 However,
other South Carolina litigants have passed the "public importance"
test and have thus been able to sue, despite failing more stringent
*260criteria for standing.
Ohio case law indicates that citizens who fail traditional tests for
standing may nevertheless litigate in the state courts "when the issues
sought to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the
public"'26-though no reported case grants standing to an Ohio
taxpayer under this rationale.6 In a similar vein, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognizes state taxpayer standing when, inter alia,
"the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged,"
"judicial relief is appropriate," and "no other persons are better
situated to assert the claim."263 Likewise, the Wyoming Supreme
Court "recognize[s] a more expansive or relaxed definition of
standing when a matter of great public interest or importance is at
stake."2a
B. Broader Taxpayer Standing
In contrast to those state courts that grant taxpayer standing for
cases of particular importance, other state courts articulate a broader
approach to taxpayer standing. Under this more expansive approach,
taxpayer standing is recognized without an assessment of the relative
importance of the case being brought by the plaintiff-taxpayer. For
example, in Britnell v. Alabama State Board of Education, Alabama
taxpayers challenged a $4,000 salary raise for the Superintendent of
the State Board of Education. Before reaching the merits of this
challenge, the Alabama Supreme Court declared "a plaintiff suing in
257. Id. at 341.
258. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. Id. at 341-42.
260. Id. at 341 n.2.
261. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082
(Ohio 1999).
262. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Miami Univ., 2007 Ohio 4372 (2007) at 1 60 (rejecting
taxpayer's "argument that he possesses public-right standing because his lawsuit involves a
matter of great public interest.").
263. Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323,329 (Pa. 1986).
264. Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 38 P.3d 1073, 1077 (Wyo. 2002).
265. 374 So. 2d 282,283 (Ala. 1979).
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his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer has standing to attack the
constitutionality of expenditures.""
Britnell, in turn, relied on Zeigler v. Baker decided two years
earlier.2 67 In Zeigler, an Alabama taxpayer challenged the pensions
granted to former governors.' Confirming the taxpayer's standing to
bring his suit in the state courts, the Alabama Supreme Court
specifically rejected the federal rule against taxpayer standing as
articulated in Schlesinger and Richardson.69  As previously
mentioned, in Alabama, a person "suing in his capacity as a citizen
and taxpayer, has standing to attack the constitutionality" of state
expenditures.270
Like the Alabama courts, the Florida courts grant taxpayer
standing without first determining whether the case being brought is
of particular importance. In Brown v. Firestone, the plaintiffs "as
citizens and taxpayers" challenged the constitutionality of several
gubernatorial vetoes of state appropriations legislation."' While
"their stake in the outcome of this controversy rest[ed] on an
extremely slender reed," these citizen/taxpayers had standing in the
Florida courts to "mount a constitutional attack upon the legislature's
taxing and spending power without having to demonstrate a special
injury."272 Of course, "special injury" is critical to the federal concept
of standing.273
Eleven years later, in Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F,
Florida foster children, "in their capacity as taxpayers," challenged
the constitutionality of legislation authorizing an executive branch
commission to reduce state expenditures to avoid a state budget
deficit." Gone from the Florida Supreme Court's discussion of
taxpayer standing was the earlier rhetoric about "slender reed[s].""'
Rather, citing Brown, the court in broad terms affirmed "that a
266. Id. at 285.
267. 344 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1977).
268. Baker was also an Alabama state senator, but did "not rely upon [this] status" for
standing. Id. at 763.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 764.
271. 382 So. 2d 654,657 (Fla. 1980).
272. Id. at 662.
273. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (standing in
federal court requires injury which is "concrete and particularized" rather than injury "in
common with people generally.").
274. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 263 n.5 (Fla. 1991).
275. Brown, 382 So. 2d 654,662.
40 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:1
Fall 20121 STATE TAXPAYER STANDING AFTER CUNO AND WINN
citizen and taxpayer can challenge the constitutional validity of an
exercise of the legislature's taxing and spending power without having
to demonstrate a special injury."276
In McKee v. Likins, the Minnesota Supreme Court similarly
affirmed that, under Minnesota law, "a state or local taxpayer has
sufficient interest to challenge illegal expenditures."' Mr. McKee
was a property taxpayer of Ramsey County who opposed abortion."
Under Minnesota law, he had standing to challenge Medicaid-
financed abortions: "[T]he right of a taxpayer to maintain an action in
the courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds cannot be
denied."279
Colorado's Supreme Court has likewise affirmed "broad
taxpayer standing in the trial and appellate courts."' In particular,
"taxpayers [of the Centennial State] have standing to seek to enjoin
an unlawful expenditure of public funds."" Standing for taxpayers to
challenge public expenditures has been recognized as well by the
courts of Missouri,28 Montana,m North Carolina,' Nebraska,"
276. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 263, n.5. See also Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch.
Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. 1996) ("This Court has held that a citizen and
taxpayer can challenge the constitutional validity of an exercise of the legislature's taxing
and spending power without having to demonstrate a special injury. Furthermore, in
Florida, unlike the federal system, the doctrine of standing has not been rigidly followed.")
(internal citations and quotation marks deleted).
277. 261 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn. 1977).
278. Id. at 568.
279. Id. at 571.
280. Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 246 (Colo. 2008) (internal quotation marks
deleted).
281. Id. (internal quotation marks deleted).
282. Manzara v. State, 343 S.W. 3d 656, 659 (Mo. 2011) (For standing, "a taxpayer
must establish that one of three conditions exists: (1) a direct expenditure of funds
generated through taxation; (2) an increased levy in taxes; or (3) a pecuniary loss
attributable to the challenged transaction of a municipality."). However, the Missouri
Supreme Court holds that a state tax credit is not an expenditure of public funds and thus
cannot be challenged in court by taxpayers. Id.
283. Butte-Silver Bow Local Gov't v. State, 768 P.2d 327, 329 (Mont. 1989) ("a
taxpayer will have standing to question the validity of a tax, or the expenditure of tax
monies, provided the issue(s) presented directly affect the constitutional validity to collect
or use the proceeds of the tax by the state or a local government entity.") (parenthetical in
original).
284. Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876, 881 (N.C. 2006) ("the right of a citizen and
taxpayer to maintain an action in the courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to
his injury cannot be denied.") (internal quotation marks and citations deleted).
285. Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 644 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Neb. 2002) ("A resident
taxpayer, without showing any interest or injury peculiar to itself, may bring an action to
enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds raised for governmental purposes.").
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Oklahoma, Texas,' and Utah.m Under Tennessee's case law, a
taxpayer of the Volunteer State has "standing to challenge the
legality of the expenditure of public funds" if the taxpayer "allege[s] a
specific illegality" and has "made a prior demand on the
governmental entity asking it to correct the alleged illegality."8
C. State Taxpayer Standing by Statute
Instead of (or in addition to) judge-made rules permitting
taxpayers to sue as such, some states establish taxpayer standing by
statute. A California statute, for example, authorizes actions to stop
"any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or
other property of a county, town, city or city and county." Such
actions may be maintained by citizens residing in the defendant
municipality or "by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to
pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has
paid, a tax" in such municipality.291 While the California statute on its
face is limited to suits challenging municipal expenditures, the
California courts have interpreted the statute to authorize "taxpayer
action[s] ... against the State."" In Vasquez v. State of California, for
example, a California taxpayer successfully challenged the failure of
the California Department of Corrections to "ensure [the] payment of
prevailing wages to the inmates" working for a private
manufacturer" since some of those wages were owed to the state to
286. Oklahoma Pub. Emp's Ass'n v. Oklahoma Dep't of Cent. Serv's, 55 P.3d 1072,
1078 (Okla. 2002) ("a taxpayer possesses standing to seek equitable relief when alleging
that a violation of a statute will result in an illegal expenditure of public funds or the
imposition of an illegal tax.").
287. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000) ("a taxpayer has
standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without
showing a distinct injury.").
288. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Utah 1983) ("We have also extended the
taxpayer's right to sue concerning illegal use of public monies to include an action against
the state.").
289. Lewis v. Cleveland Mun. Airport Auth., 289 S.W.3d 808, 816 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2008).
290. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (2012).
291. Id.
292. Vasquez v. State of California, 105 Cal App 4th 849, 852 (2003). See also id. at
854 ("The individual citizen must be able to take the initiative through taxpayers' suits to
keep government accountable on the state as well as on the local level.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
293. Id. at 853.
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reimburse the public treasury for the cost of the inmates' board and
room. 29
Another statutory basis for taxpayer standing in California is the
law which allows anyone who is "beneficially interested"295 to obtain a
"writ of mandate"' when "there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy, in the ordinary course of law."' "The beneficial interest
standard is so broad, even citizen or taxpayer standing may be
sufficient to obtain relief in mandamus."2m
New York's State Finance Law Section 123-b(1) authorizes "a
citizen taxpayer" to "maintain an action for equitable or declaratory
relief, or both, against an officer or employee of the state who in the
course of his or her duties has caused, is now causing, or is about to
cause a wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication or
any other illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of state funds or
state property.. ." A "citizen taxpayer" may maintain such an action
"whether or not such person is or may be affected or specially
aggrieved by [such] . . . expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication
or . . . disbursement .. 9."9
In Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, New
York's highest judicial tribunal, the Court of Appeals, held that
Section 123-(b)(1) granted standing to "citizen-taxpayers" to
challenge the use of public funds to implement the 1993 Compact
between New York's governor and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe.'
That Compact authorized the Tribe to operate a casino and had been
signed by the Empire State's governor without legislative approval."0 '
The plaintiffs, including the citizen-taxpayers, challenged the
Compact and the use of state funds to implement the Compact. The
Compact, they contended, violated the constitutional separation of
powers as the governor lacked authority to execute the Compact
absent legislative authorization of the Compact. On the merits, the
Court of Appeals agreed.3 0
294. Id. at 856.
295. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1086 (2012).
296. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1085(a) (2011).
297. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1086 (2012).
298. Doe v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist, 190 Cal. App. 4th 668, 685 (2010) (internal
quotations and citations deleted).
299. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §123-b(1) (2012).
300. 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003).
301. Id. at 1049.
302. Id. at 1061.
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Before reaching the substance of the lawsuit, the Court held that
Section 123-(b)(1) gave the plaintiff/citizen/taxpayers standing to
pursue their claim. According to the Court, that section requires the
court "to distinguish between cases that present a challenge to the
expenditure of money and those that use the expenditure of money as
a pretense to challenge a governmental decision."" As to the former,
citizen/taxpayers have statutory standing; as to the latter, they do not.
In this case, the Court of Appeals held, the citizen/taxpayers "have
sufficiently alleged a challenge to the expenditure of state money" to
have standing to sue."
A contrary ruling, the Court of Appeals stated, would mean that
"an important constitutional issue would be effectively insulated from
judicial review" since no one would have standing to sue.0 As we
have seen, the dominant view in the case law of the U.S. Supreme
Court is different, namely, that, if no one has standing, this means the
issue in question is appropriately assigned to the political branches of
government .
The Court of Appeals in Saratoga County Chamber of
Commerce distinguishes its prior decision in Matter of Colella v.
Board of Assessors. In Colella, the Court of Appeals held that local
property taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a property tax
exemption extended to the Yun Lin Temple, a Buddhist religious
corporationY8 There is, the Court held in Colella, no taxpayer
standing to contest the "religious use tax exemption [of] a single
parcel of real estate."' In contrast, the issue presented in Saratoga
County Chamber of Commerce was "fundamental and of immense
public significance.""0 "Standing is properly satisfied here, lest
303. Id. at 1053.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 489 (1982) ("But the assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no
one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.") (internal quotation marks
deleted); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (If the absence of standing
means that "no particular or class [can] litigate these claims," that suggests that "the
subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political
process.").
307. 741 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 2000).
308. Id. at 114.
309. Id. at 116.
310. 798 N.E.2d at 1054.
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procedural hurdles forever foreclose adjudication of the underlying
constitutional issue."."
The Colella Court had distinguished its denial of taxpayer
standing in that case from Dudley v. Kerwick in which property
owners challenged "the enrollment, en masse, of 88% of the town's
landowners as officers in an allegedly religious denomination known
as the Universal Life Church."3 12 This enrollment exempted from
property taxation the bulk of the town's property with "the remaining
landowners ... pay[ing] the full $500,000 annual governmental
expense of the town."313 While the Dudley Court did not expressly
use the term "standing," it allowed the plaintiffs to challenge this
"exemption from taxation in wholesale fashion." 314 The property
owners refusing to join the Universal Life Church "allege[d] a broad
perversion of the entire process of granting exemptions, with the
resulting deterioration of the tax base and imposition on petitioners
of a hugely disproportionate share of municipal expenses."'
A Massachusetts statute authorizes "twenty-four taxable
inhabitants of the commonwealth, not more than six of whom shall be
from any one county" to sue prospectively to prevent any
"department, commission, board, officer, employee or agent of the
commonwealth" from illegally or unconstitutionally "expend[ing]
money or incur[ring] obligations purporting to bind the
commonwealth." 316 A South Dakota statute authorizes "[any citizen
and taxpayer residing within a municipality [to] maintain an action or
proceeding to prevent, by proper remedy, a violation of any provision
of" the title governing municipalities in the Mount Rushmore State."
Ohio's statutes on taxpayer standing embody a derivative
approach under which local taxpayers may sue on behalf of a locality
if such taxpayers first demand of appropriate government officials
that they sue and these officials decline. At the county level, Ohio
Revised Code section 309.12 authorizes "the prosecuting attorney" to
sue to protect the county treasury from a variety of financial
improprieties."8 In particular, the prosecuting attorney may sue to
311. Id.
312. Dudley v. Kerwick, 421 N.E.2d 797, 798 (N.Y. 1981).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 800.
315. Id. at 799-800.
316. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 29, § 63 (2012).
317. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-1-6 (2012).
318. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 309.12 (2012).
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prevent or to recover, inter alia, if county funds "are about to be or
have been misapplied," "public moneys have been illegally drawn or
withheld from the county treasury," an illegal contract "has been
executed or is about to be entered into," or an illegal "contract was
procured by fraud or corruption . . ..".. If "a taxpayer of the county"
makes a "written request" to the prosecuting attorney to file such an
action and the prosecuting attorney "fails" to do so, the taxpayer may
then file on behalf of the county.320 Similar rules authorize municipal
taxpayers in Ohio to sue to protect municipal funds if, after the
taxpayer's written request, "the village solicitor or city director of law
fails" to file such a suit "on behalf of the municipal corporation." 2'
Arizona also has a derivative-style statute which permits a
taxpayer to sue "in the name of the state to enjoin the illegal payment
of public monies ... or if the monies have been paid, to recover such
monies""2 if the taxpayer first requests the attorney general to sue
and he "fails" to do so."
D. Summary
In short, whether by statute or case law, most states have more
liberal taxpayer standing rules than prevail in the federal courts. A
minority of states emulates the federal approach and thus always
denies standing to taxpayers absent individualized harm.324 However,
the majority rule is that, by case law and/or statutes, state taxpayers
generally have standing to challenge state taxes and expenditures in
the state courts even if such taxpayers lack the kind of individualized
harm necessary for standing in the federal courts.
IV. Cuno and Winn Channel Litigation to the State Courts
Since state taxpayers who lack standing in the federal courts
typically have standing to raise federal constitutional questions in the
state courts, Cuno and Winn do not foreclose state taxpayers'
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 733.59 (2012).
322. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-212(A) (2012).
323. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213(A) (2012).
324. See, e.g., Baer v. New Hampshire Department of Education, 160 N.H. 727, 731
(2010) ("taxpayer status, without an injury or an impairment of rights, is not sufficient to
confer standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. ); W Farms Mall, LLC v.
Town of W. Hartford, 279 Conn. 1, 23 (2006) (Despite many states' case law, "we decline
to determine expressly whether a taxpayer has standing to assert a claim predicated on
misappropriation of public funds...").
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constitutional challenges to state taxes and spending. Rather, Cuno
and Winn channel such litigation to the state courts where state
taxpayers have the standing they lack in the federal courts.
To see this, let us revisit Nyqyuist, Hunt and Mueller. Both the
majority325 and minority... opinions in Winn suggest that Winn, by
denying taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause challenges to tax
expenditures, precludes taxpayer/plaintiffs from pursuing these kinds
of cases in federal court. A review of these decisions yields a more
complete conclusion, namely, that state taxpayers foreclosed from the
federal courts can often pursue in the state courts their challenges to
state spending and taxes under the U.S. Constitution.
Consider first Nyquist, an Establishment Clause case brought by
"an incorporated association . . . and several individuals who were
residents and taxpayers in New York, some of whom had children
attending public schools."' The Nyquist plaintiffs successfully
challenged monetary grants from the New York State treasury to
private schools as well as state grants and income tax deductions
given to parents sending their children to private schools.328 The
original Nyquist defendants were executive branch officials of the
State of New York.32 9 Status as intervening defendants was granted to
leaders of the New York state senate and "to a group of parents with
children enrolled in nonpublic schools. ""
After Winn, the Nyquist taxpayers still have Flast standing in
federal court to challenge under the First Amendment the Empire
State's monetary grants to private schools as well as the state's
monetary grants to parents sending their children to such schools.
However, under Winn, the Nyquist taxpayers today lack federal
standing to challenge the tax deductions bestowed by New York upon
private school parents. Cuno further confirms that the Nyquist
taxpayers' standing in the federal courts to contest New York's direct
monetary grants does not produce supplemental standing to litigate in
federal court the tax benefits also offered by the Empire State.'
325. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Wina, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1448-49 (2011). The
Winn majority and minority made similar observations about Walz which I discuss below
in the context of municipal taxpayer standing.
326. Id. at 1453-54.
327. Comm. For Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,762 (1973).
328. Id. at 763-764.
329. Id. at 762.
330. Id.
331. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,349-353 (2006).
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As an alternative to the federal courts, the Nyquist plaintiffs had
(and have today) standing in New York's courts under New York's
State Finance Law Section 123-b(1) to challenge the state grant
programs. The Nyquist plaintiffs were "citizen taxpayer[s]" attacking
each of the grant programs as "a wrongful expenditure,
misappropriation, misapplication or any other illegal or
unconstitutional disbursement of state funds.. ."332 Thus, under
Section 123-b(1), the Nyquist plaintiffs have standing to pursue their
First Amendment claims in the New York courts against New York's
monetary grants to private schools and to private school parents.
It is likely that under Section 123-b(1) these taxpayer/plaintiffs
could today also challenge in the state courts the New York State
income tax deductions for parents sending their offspring to private
schools. From the widely-accepted vantage of tax expenditure
theory,' such deductions constitute "expenditure[s]."" Moreover,
denying "citizen taxpayer[s]" the ability to litigate the
constitutionality of these state income tax deductions would result in
"an important constitutional issue ... be[ing] effectively insulated
from judicial review."33' It thus seems likely that the New York courts
would construe Section 123(b)-i to permit First Amendment
challenges in the New York State courts to state tax benefits such as
the deduction at issue in Nyquist. If so, the net effect of Cuno and
Winn is to route future Nyquist-type First Amendment challenges to
New York state tax benefits to the New York state courts.
Hunt v. McNair was decided simultaneously with Nyquist and
was brought by a South Carolina taxpayer who challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds revenue bonds issued by an authority
of the Palmetto State." The proceeds of these state-sponsored bonds
were used to refinance and construct facilities for the Baptist College
at Charleston. The college was ultimately responsible for paying the
interest and principal owed on these state-issued bonds.3
Nyquist had been litigated in the lower federal courts before
going to the U.S. Supreme Court. In contrast, Hunt was brought in
the South Carolina courts. In Hunt, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
332. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §123-b(l) (McKinney 2012).
333. See supra notes 192 and 219.
334. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §123-b(1) (McKinney 2012).
335. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1053
(N.Y. 2003).
336. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
337. Id. at 737-738.
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the ruling of the South Carolina Supreme Court that state-sponsored
revenue bonds did not violate the First Amendment even though the
proceeds of such bonds benefitted a religious institution of higher
learning."
In its two opinions in Hunt, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reached the merits of Mr. Hunt's Establishment Clause claim without
considering his standing to bring the case. As we have seen, under
South Carolina law, "general standing requirements" will be waived
when a plaintiff raises "an issue of such public importance as to
require its resolution for future guidance."339 It is thus unsurprising
that Mr. Hunt's ability to bring his First Amendment case was taken
for granted sub silentio in the South Carolina courts.
Winn today still grants Mr. Hunt Flast taxpayer standing in the
U.S. Supreme Court. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed, the
Baptist College benefitted from the tax-exempt status of the bonds
issued by the South Carolina authority." Since these bonds yielded
tax exempt interest, the bonds carried and the college paid a lower
rate of interest than if the college had issued taxable bonds without
the state's involvement.
However, Mr. Hunt objected, not to the bonds' tax-exempt
status, but, rather, to state involvement in the financing of the
religious college's facilities. Mr. Hunt's Establishment Clause
argument would have applied if South Carolina had issued on the
Baptist College's behalf taxable bonds bearing market rates of
interest. Mr. Hunt complained not about the tax benefits associated
with the state-sponsored bonds, but about the bonds themselves.
Winn does not preclude Mr. Hunt's Flast-type challenge in the federal
courts, a challenge to state support for a religious college, not to tax
benefits for state bonds.
On the other hand, the Nyquist taxpayers, if they challenged the
Empire State's income tax deduction in the state courts, would today
lack standing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court because of the
Winn decision. For these state taxpayers, New York's highest court,
the Court of Appeals, would be the end of the line if that court were
to uphold New York's tax deduction against an Establishment Clause
challenge. In contrast, if the New York Court of Appeals were to
rule against the deduction (as the U.S. Supreme Court actually did),
338. Id. at 749.




then the private school parents thereby denied the deduction, like the
ASARCO lessees, would have individualized injury and would thus
have standing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Mueller, like the Nyquist challenge to the Empire State's income
tax deductions, is today foreclosed from the federal courts by Winn
and its rule that taxpayers lack Flast standing to mount Establishment
Clause challenges to tax benefits."' Mueller was brought in the
federal courts by "certain Minnesota taxpayers"" who objected on
Establishment Clause grounds to a Minnesota income tax deduction
for "tuition, textbooks and transportation"3 outlays expended in
connection with "elementary or secondary" education." The
Minnesota deduction is the kind of tax benefit which, per Winn, can
no longer be contested by state taxpayers in the federal courts.
Will the Minnesota courts grant standing for a Mueller-type
challenge to state tax deductions? Again, the answer depends upon
whether tax expenditures are treated in the same way as traditional
cash expenditures. Tax expenditure theory indicates that a tax
deduction is a "use of public funds."345 If so, then the Minnesota
taxpayers in Mueller could bring their Establishment Clause challenge
in the Minnesota courts. In that scenario, a Minnesota Supreme
Court ruling upholding the state income tax deduction under the U.S.
Constitution would be final since Minnesota taxpayers now lack
standing in the U.S. Supreme Court in light of Winn's rejection of
state taxpayer standing to contest tax benefits. On the other hand, if
the Minnesota Supreme Court were to strike a state income tax
deduction on First Amendment grounds, the Minnesota parents using
the deduction (again, like the ASARCO lessees) would have standing
to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court which, in Mueller as it actually
happened, upheld the Minnesota income tax deduction under the
Establishment Clause.
In short, by shutting the federal courts to most state taxpayer
challenges, Cuno and Winn do not foreclose constitutional challenges
to state taxes and expenditures. Rather, Cuno and Winn instead
channel those challenges to the state courts with their more liberal
taxpayer standing rules. Nyquist- and Mueller-type challenges to the
constitutionality of state income tax deductions, today foreclosed
341. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
342. Id. at 392.
343. Id. at 391 (n. 1, quoting MINN. STAT. § 290.09, subd. 22 (1983)).
344. Id.
345. McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566,571 (Minn. 1977).
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from the federal courts for lack of taxpayer standing, can still be
brought in the state courts with their generally more expansive
notions of taxpayer standing.
This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the alternative
courses Cuno might have taken in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in that case. This counterfactual demonstrates again that
Cuno and Winn do not foreclose state taxpayers' constitutional
litigation against state taxes and expenditures but, rather, route such
litigation to the state courts.
The Cuno plaintiffs wanted to litigate in the Ohio state courts the
constitutionality of the state income tax credits and of the municipal
property tax exemptions extended to DaimlerChrysler for building its
new plant in Toledo. The Cuno plaintiffs had plausible claims to
standing in the Ohio courts under the Ohio derivative-style statute for
municipal taxpayers" and under the Ohio case law granting standing
to taxpayers raising issues "of great importance and interest to the
public.""7 Had the Ohio courts upheld the Ohio income tax credits
granted to DaimlerChrysler, that would have been the end of the
road as the Cuno plaintiff-taxpayers lacked standing under federal
law to proceed in the federal courts in general and in the U.S.
Supreme Court in particular. However, had the courts of the
Buckeye State agreed with the plaintiff-taxpayers and held
unconstitutional the Ohio income tax credits granted to
DaimlerChrysler, DaimlerChrysler would, like the ASARCO lessees,
have suffered particularized injury from the state courts' invalidation
of the credits and would thus have had standing to appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Alternatively, the Cuno plaintiffs could have bifurcated their
litigation, challenging the constitutionality of the state tax credits in
the Ohio state courts while simultaneously contesting the
constitutionality of the local property tax exemptions in the federal
courts. In this scenario also, the denial of state taxpayer standing in
the federal courts routes the constitutional challenge to the Ohio
income tax credits to the Ohio state courts-where the actual Cuno
plaintiffs started their litigation and wanted to stay.
As to Winn, we need not speculate about the alternative of state
court litigation since such litigation in fact occurred. Before the Winn
plaintiffs began their lawsuit in the federal courts, an essentially
346. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 733.59 (West 2012).
347. State ex re. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio
1999).
identical challenge to the Arizona tax credits for STOs was brought in
the Arizona state courts." When the Arizona Supreme Court
declared those credits compliant with the federal constitution, the
plaintiffs sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court and were
rejected."9 The Winn taxpayer/plaintiffs then pursued their parallel
litigation in the federal courts. Today the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court, upholding the STO tax credits under the U.S.
Constitution, marks the end of the road since the Arizona
taxpayer/plaintiffs lack standing to seek certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court or to commence litigation in the U.S. District Court.
In sum, Cuno and Winn only foreclose state taxpayer standing in
the federal courts. Since state taxpayers often possess standing in the
state courts to challenge state taxes and expenditures under the U.S.
Constitution, Cuno and Winn will channel state taxpayers'
constitutional challenges to state taxes and expenditures to the state
courts where such taxpayers have the standing they lack in the federal
courts.
V. Municipal Taxpayer Standing as Historical Anomaly
Except for the limited area still governed by Flast, i.e.,
Establishment Clause challenges to direct outlays, there is today no
federal or state taxpayer standing in the federal courts to mount
constitutional challenges to federal or state taxes and expenditures.
On the other hand, municipal taxpayers have plenary standing to
contest local taxes and budgetary outlays in the federal courts.
Frothingham first stated that municipal taxpayers have standing
in the federal courts to challenge local expenditures and taxes.' This
proposition has subsequently been confirmed."' Neither Cuno nor
Winn change this result or otherwise impair the standing in federal
courts of local taxpayers challenging local government policies.
For three reasons, it is anomalous to grant taxpayer standing in
the federal courts to municipal taxpayers while simultaneously
denying federal court standing to state taxpayers. First, as Professor
Staudt observed even before Cuno and Winn, "many local taxpayers
reside in cities and localities that are far more populous and have
348. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273 (1999).
349. Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U.S. 921 (1999).
350. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487-87 (1923).
351. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,613 (1989) (quoting Frothingham).
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bigger budgets than many states."35 2 It is unpersuasive to characterize
for standing purposes a resident of New York City as having a
"direct" interest in the tax and budgetary practices of the City of New
York (pop. 8,175,133) while declaring that a state taxpayer in
Wyoming (pop. 532,981) has too remote an interest in her state's
taxes and expenditures to justify standing in federal court. In this
vein, Judge Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recently criticized municipal taxpayer standing in the federal courts:
Thirty-two cities currently have populations larger than at
least one State, and New York City, the largest municipality in
the country, holds more people than 39 States. If the point of
limiting taxpayer standing is to avoid the resolution of
generalized grievances in federal court, why does a New
Yorker have standing based on an injury shared with
8,275,000 others while a resident of North Dakota lacks
standing based on an injury shared with 647,000 others?3 3
However, this is where federal law stands today.
Second, the premises underlying municipal taxpayer standing are
no longer valid, even if they once were. Underlying Frothingham's
approval of municipal taxpayer standing is a vision of local
government as a small-scale enterprise resembling similarly small-
scale private corporations. Frothingham's vision of both
municipalities and corporations is today quaint to the point of
irrelevance.
In 1923, Frothingham declared that a municipal taxpayer has
standing in the federal courts because a local taxpayer has a "direct
and immediate"' interest in local government resembling "that
subsisting between stockholder and private corporation.""' Whether
or not that vision of localities and corporations as similar, small-scale
enterprises was still realistic in 1923, it is not today.
For the justices of the Frothingham Court, the analogy between
local governments and corporations likely resonated because of the
historic origins of local governments in corporate law."' However,
352. Staudt, supra note 113 at 841.
353. Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 641 F.3d 197, 221 (6th Cir. 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring).
354. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
355. Id. at 487.
356. Id.
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the analogy is today unpersuasive. While local governments are
today still labeled "municipal corporations," no one now understands
that label as meaning that local governments are legally comparable
to commercial corporations)? Localities today are governments, not
quasi-business corporations. And most local governments and
publicly traded corporations today lack the intimate relationships
with their taxpayers and shareholders perceived by the Frothingham
Court in 1923.
It is accordingly an historic anomaly in the contemporary world
to declare that a municipal taxpayer has a corporate-style, "direct and
immediate" interest in his local taxes and budgets, unlike his more
remote interest in federal and state taxes and outlays. This, however,
is the premise underlying municipal taxpayer standing in the federal
courts.
Third, municipal government, a creature of state law, is often
deployed as an instrument of state policymaking. Frequently, for
example, states bestow funds upon municipalities" and mandate that
localities provide specific public services."' Among other concerns,
the Winn dissent focused on the fungibility of tax benefits and cash
distributions' just as the Valley Forge dissents focused on the
fungibility of property and cash? In similar fashion, from the
perspective of state decision makers, municipal and state policies are
often close substitutes for one another. It is accordingly unpersuasive
for the federal courts to entertain constitutional challenges to the
actions of state policymakers when such policymakers act through
municipal law, while foreclosing constitutional challenges to the
actions of those same policymakers when they utilize state taxes and
outlays.
Consider in this context the local property tax exemption at issue
in Cuno. That municipal exemption was authorized and governed by
357. Id.
358. See Smith, 641 F. 2d at 222 ("Perhaps in 1923 it was easy to speak of city and state
treasuries as distinct. Yet today, particularly in the context of a public school case, it is
pure fiction to think of municipal (or county) treasuries as holding money raised only
through local taxes.") (Sutton, J., concurring) (parenthesis in original).
359. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 741 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation and
the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest and Public Services, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1355 (1993).
360. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1450-51 (2011).
361. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 511-12, 515 (1982).
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Ohio state law." As an alternative to this local property tax
exemption, Ohio could instead have offset DaimlerChrysler's
property tax burden on its new plant by granting a state income tax
credit for such property taxes. From the vantages of
DaimlerChrysler, the Ohio treasury and the affected municipalities,
this alternative would have been, in economic terms, largely
indistinguishable from the municipal property tax exemption actually
authorized by state law and granted to DaimlerChrysler.363
DaimlerChrysler's ultimate economic position is the same whether it
pays no property taxes or pays such taxes and receives an offsetting
income tax credit.
It is unpersuasive for current federal standing law to dispense
different treatment to the taxpayers questioning these economically
identical approaches, i.e., to grant standing in federal court for a
municipal taxpayer to challenge the local property tax exemption
while denying standing in federal court for that same individual, in his
capacity as an Ohio state taxpayer, to challenge an economically
equivalent Ohio income tax credit for local property taxes.
Consider as well a variant on the state income tax credits at issue
in Winn. Suppose that, in lieu of such credits, Arizona had authorized
(or mandated) municipal governments to give matching grants to any
resident of the municipality contributing to an STO. From the
vantages of the donors receiving this match and of the STOs receiving
contributions, this alternative would have been economically
indistinguishable from the state income tax credits Arizona actually
adopted. An Arizona taxpayer contributing to an STO is in the same
economic position if his contribution triggers a municipal grant to him
or a state income tax credit. However, under current law, a municipal
taxpayer has standing in the federal courts to challenge the
constitutionality of municipal matching grants, though that same
individual, as a state taxpayer, lacks standing in the federal courts to
challenge an economically equivalent state income tax credit.
As we have seen, Winn and Cuno do not bar state taxpayers
from bringing constitutional challenges to state taxes and
expenditures; rather, they channel such challenges to the state courts
where state taxpayers typically have the standing they lack in the
362. OHIO. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 5709.62(C)(1), 5709.631.
363. To make this hypothetical state tax credit perfectly indistinguishable from the
municipal property tax exemption, it would be necessary for Ohio to reduce state




federal courts. Just as the states provide more liberal standing to state
taxpayers, the states afford generous standing to municipal
taxpayers. Since state taxpayers must now bring their generalized
constitutional challenges to state taxes and outlays in the state courts,
it is anomalous to permit municipal taxpayers to bring similar
constitutional challenges to local taxes and expenditures in the
federal courts; the state courts are available to municipal taxpayers as
well.
Instructive in this context is a comparison of Nyquist and Walz.
Today, under Winn, the Nyquist taxpayers must mount their
constitutional challenge to New York State tax deductions in the
courts of the Empire State while Mr. Walz, a New York City property
taxpayer, has standing in the federal courts to object to the New York
tax exemption for church property. By such criteria as population
and the size of its governmental budget, New York City is larger than
most states.65  Frothinghman's premise for municipal taxpayer
standing in the federal courts is that, in contrast to a federal or state
taxpayer, a local taxpayer has a "direct and immediate"6 interest in
municipal outlays, an interest resembling "that subsisting between
stockholder and private corporation."" While that premise may be
plausible today for a local taxpayer who lives in a small town or in a
modestly-sized suburban community, it is unconvincing as applied to
Mr. Walz and the residents of other large cities.
Moreover, New York State's Constitution mandated the
municipal property tax exemption for church properties to which Mr.
Walz objected. There is no reason for permitting local taxpayers like
Mr. Walz to litigate in the federal courts against the municipal tax
rules promulgated by governors and legislators now that, per Cuno
and Winn, those courts have been closed to challenges to the state tax
policies formulated by those same state officials.
VI. The Problem (or Not) of Federal Constitutional Law
Unsupervised by the U.S. Supreme Court
As a result of Cuno, Winn and the states' more liberal taxpayer
standing rules, there will emerge a body of federal constitutional law
364. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 526a; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 309.12,
309.13 and 733.59; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-1-6.
365. The 2010 census put New York City's population at 8,175,133, a population larger
than 39 of the states.
366. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
367. Id. at 487.
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over which the U.S. Supreme Court lacks direct supervisory
authority, namely, decisions of the state courts upholding state tax
and spending policies in the face of state taxpayers' Cuno- and Winn-
type constitutional challenges to those policies. Since the state
taxpayers bringing these cases will lack individualized harm, they will
lack standing in the federal courts. Hence, the resulting constitutional
decisions of the state courts will not be reviewable by the U.S.
Supreme Court when these taxpayers lose in the state courts.
On balance, state court judges, elected or appointed for a term of
years, will be more inclined to uphold state taxes and expenditures
against constitutional challenges than will life-tenured federal judges.
Consequently, this body of constitutional law, developed in the state
courts, will be more permissive toward state tax and expenditure
policies than would a comparable body of constitutional case law
constructed in the federal courts.
Moreover, this state-friendly constitutional case law will be
smaller quantitatively than a comparable body of decisions in the
federal courts would be. As it becomes clear that state courts are less
receptive to claims brought under the U.S. Constitution by state
taxpayers against state expenditures and tax policies, fewer taxpayers
will bring such claims.
Recall in this context the litigation in the Arizona state courts
challenging the constitutionality of the Grand Canyon state's income
tax credit for contributions to STOs.'6 Today, as a result of Cuno and
Winn, that litigation would end with the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court upholding the Arizona tax credit under the First
Amendment. Because Arizona state taxpayers have standing in the
state but not the federal courts to bring generalized challenges to
state tax benefits, such taxpayers, when they lose in the state courts,
will have no recourse to the federal judiciary. The same is also true
today of Cuno-type constitutional challenges to state tax credits and
Nyquist- and Mueller-type challenges to state tax deductions. These
cases will be brought in the state courts where state taxpayers have
standing-and will end in the state courts if such courts uphold the
contested tax benefits under the U.S. Constitution. The state
taxpayers bringing these suits claim no individualized harm and thus
lack standing to go further into the federal courts including the U.S.
Supreme Court.
368. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273 (1999).
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At least at the margins and perhaps more fundamentally, state
judges, generally elected" or appointed.o for fixed terms of office,
will be more inclined to sustain state taxes and expenditures against
constitutional challenges than would life-tenured federal judges.
Cases like Cuno, Winn, Muller, Nyquist, Hunt, and Walz rarely
involve the straightforward application of settled law. More typically,
adjudicating constitutional cases like these entails the exercise of
some (often a significant) measure of judicial volition since these
cases are seldom controlled "by the unambiguous language of
authoritative documents."37' In the exercise this volition, some,
perhaps many, state judges will be inclined to uphold the policies
enacted by the governors and legislators whose electoral support such
judges need for reelection or whose political support such judges need
for reappointment and confirmation. Even if state judges are not
affected by the prospects of reelection or reappointment, they are
situated in the culture of state government and will thus generally be
more predisposed to support the decisions of state legislators and
governors than will be federal judges, who are not so situated. Thus,
the body of law developed under the U.S. Constitution by the state
courts after Cuno and Winn will, on balance, likely be more state-
friendly than a comparable body of decisions crafted by life-tenured
federal judges.
Instructive in this context is the literature which assesses whether
judges decide cases differently depending upon the method by which
such judges are selected (e.g., gubernatorial appointment v. partisan
election) or the nature of their tenures (e.g., short v. long-terms of
office). 2 What emerges from this literature is, in many ways, a
369. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 ("The terms of office of Supreme and
Appellate Court Judges shall be ten years; of Circuit Judges, six years; and of Associate
Judges, four years."); ILL. CONST. art. VI, §12(a) ("Judges shall be elected at general or
judicial elections...").
370. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. V, §2 as amended by CONN. CONST. amend. art.
XXV (judges are "nominated by the governor from candidates submitted by the judicial
selection commission" and "appointed by the general assembly" "for the term of eight
years.").
371. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1, 9 (2006).
372. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary
at 8 ("The literature, taken as a whole, provides evidence that selection and retention
institutions influence judicial outcomes-by influencing who becomes a judge, or how
judges decide cases, or both. The literature also confirms that judges are influenced by
political factors.").
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nuanced picture. Reassuringly, legal norms and doctrines constrain
judicial decision-making. A simple story is too simple: In some areas
of the law, there is no discernible difference in the decisions of
elected and appointed judges.'
However, in other areas, particularly in matters relating to
criminal law and procedure,374 it appears that, holding other variables
constant, elected judges decide against criminal defendants more
readily than do appointed judges. This may be because there are
electoral incentives to appear tough on crime at reelection time or
because pro-prosecution candidates are more likely to be selected by
the electorate---or both.
Similarly, it is likely that some, perhaps many, state court judges,
confronted with taxpayers' challenges to state policies and
expenditures under the U.S. Constitution, will, at least at the margins,
be more supportive of such policies and expenditures than the federal
judiciary would be.
Among the countervailing considerations, elected judges can
plausibly conclude that no countermajoritarian difficulty exists when
they invalidate state laws on constitutional grounds since these judges
have their own electoral mandates from the voters. A state court
judge in her final term of office will be unconcerned about reelection
or reappointment and consequently will be more likely to strike the
tax and expenditure legislation enacted by her contemporaries in the
statehouse and the Governor's Mansion.' Other state court judges
may be early in their terms of office and can thus comfortably assume
that the incumbent governor and legislators will be out of office when
these judges seek reappointment or reelection. Or such judges, early
in their respective terms of office, may conclude that, with the passage
of time, those incumbents will move on to other issues. Moreover,
tax and expenditure policies currently being challenged by state
373. See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD
ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY at 130
(1995) ("family-law policies provide no insight into selection-method impact, revealing no
significant correlations.").
374. Id. at 131 ("elected judges, directly controlled by popular opinion, weigh in on
the side of order, and against freedom, by rejecting a due-process model of criminal justice
in favor of a crime-control model."); Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Selection
Methods and Capital Punishment in the American States in MATTHEW J. STREB (ed.),
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2007) at 197 ("state supreme court judges in capital punishment
cases may vote with an eye toward the next election.").
375. Brace and Boyea, id. at 194 ("There is a remarkable similarity of the frequency of
reversal voting between retiring judges and judges in appointive courts.").
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taxpayers today may have been adopted by earlier legislators and
governors; the current incumbents might be indifferent to (or hostile
towards) these policies and thus be unconcerned about (or supportive
of) judicial decisions to strike such policies as unconstitutional. Even
the research which concludes that judicial behavior is affected by the
method by which judges are selected and by their terms of office
suggests that these factors do not alone explain such behavior: Legal
norms and doctrines matter.376
However, on balance, state courts, in contrast to federal courts,
will be more likely to uphold state taxes and expenditures against
constitutional challenge, given the incentives such state judges face to
secure reelection or reappointment as well as the culture of state
government in which such judges are situated. When constitutional
principles and case law give reasonable scope for the exercise of
judicial volition, we can expect that, everything else being equal, state
court judges will be more inclined than their federal counterparts to
uphold state law against the constitutional challenges mounted by
state taxpayers.
Cuno and Winn will reinforce the state courts' greater tendency
to uphold state law by denying U.S. Supreme Court review of state
courts' decisions sustaining state taxes and expenditures against
challenges under the U.S. Constitution brought by state taxpayers
with generalized grievances. Since, absent individualized injury, state
taxpayers who lose in the state courts lack standing in the federal
courts, the state court decisions on the constitutionality of state taxes
and expenditures, unreviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, will be
more state-friendly than would a comparable set of decisions by
federal judges.
For the long run, this will discourage some, perhaps many, state
taxpayers from bringing such challenges. Thus, the body of case law
developed by the state courts post-Cuno, post-Winn will both be
376. Consider, for example, the research of Professors Brace and Boyea, which
demonstrates that elected judges in states with strong popular support for the death
penalty "reverse death sentences 20 percent of the time." Id. at 192. In contrast,
appointed judges in states with strong popular support for the death penalty reverse
capital punishment verdicts "29 percent of the time." Id. That statistically higher reversal
rate can plausibly be attributed to the different incentives faced by elected and appointed
judges. On the other hand, elected and appointed judges come to similar decisions in
capital cases 91 percent of the time, i.e., the 20 percent of overlapping cases when both
types of judges reverse death sentences and the 71 percent of cases when both elected and
appointed judges affirm such sentences. Thus, in 91 percent of these capital cases,
something explains the similarity of outcomes. Commonly accepted legal norms and
doctrine are the best explanation for these similar outcomes.
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more state-friendly (since state court judges will be more inclined
than federal judges to uphold state policies and expenditures under
the U.S. Constitution) and smaller (since fewer state taxpayers will
mount challenges, given their reduced odds of success in the state, as
opposed to the federal, courts).
For those who prefer a tidy legal system (I am one of these), this
prospect is, at first blush, unsettling. On a second take, however, four
considerations caution that this outcome, while messy, is potentially
manageable.
First, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in ASARCO, there is
already federal constitutional law beyond the direct supervision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, namely, the advisory opinions issued by certain
state courts on questions of federal constitutional law."' Second, our
constitutional order survives often-lengthy disagreements among the
lower courts. Circuit-splits may persist for years before the U.S.
Supreme Court resolves them.m8
Third, given how few cases the U.S. Supreme Court hears today,
that Court's direct supervision of the state courts is already quite
attenuated. 79  In the tax context, that supervision is attenuated
further by the Tax Injunction Act which channels most particularized
claims for state and local tax relief into the state courts and thereby
precludes consideration of such claims by the lower federal courts,
likely to be more responsive to the teachings of the U.S. Supreme
Court than will their state counterparts?
Finally, when state courts declare state tax laws and expenditures
unconstitutional, the state, as the injured party, has standing to seek
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. When the state courts strike
state tax and expenditure policies as unconstitutional and the state
does not seek a writ of certiorari, there will often be ASARCO-type
defendants who benefit from the stricken laws. These defendants
will, per ASARCO, have particularized injury and thus standing in the
U.S. Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court will have the
opportunity to develop constitutional principles and decisional law
relative to state taxes and expenditures whenever a state court rules
377. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,636-37 (1989).
378. Id.
379. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in
the Courts' of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE LJ. 1439, 1445-50 (2009).
380. U.S.C. § 1341 ("The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."). See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88
(2004).
61
against the state and a beneficiary of the stricken state policy or the
state itself asks the U.S. Supreme Court to review the state court's
decision under the U.S. Constitution. To create a thicker network of
cases constraining the state courts, the U.S. Supreme Court can elect
to hear more of these cases.
As a tactical matter, the state courts might become adept at
denying intervening defendant status to ASARCO-type parties to
reduce the (already small) chance that the U.S. Supreme Court will
be the final adjudicator. But, that prospect, for now at least, seems
tenuous. In short, as to state taxpayers' constitutional challenges to
state taxes and expenditures, the post-Cuno, post-Winn world will be
messy but not unmanageably so.
Instructive in this context is Freedom From Religion Foundation
v. Geithner, which challenged under the federal and California
constitutions the parsonage allowance exclusions of the federal and
California income taxes."' FFRF was brought by individuals who are
federal and California taxpayers and was filed in the U.S. District
Court prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Winn. The FFRF
taxpayers do not assert any individualized injury to themselves. They
thus now lack standing to continue this litigation in the federal courts.
However, these taxpayers have a strong claim to standing under
California law for their challenge to the California version of the
parsonage allowance, a challenge premised both on the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the equivalent
provisions of the California Constitution.
On the merits, the claim of the FFRF taxpayer/plaintiffs that the
parsonage allowance unconstitutionally entangles church and state is
unpersuasive since either alternative, i.e., taxing parsonage
allowances or not, enmeshes church and state." For present
purposes, however, the relevant issue is the standing of the FFRF
taxpayer/plaintiffs to continue their litigation in the California state
courts now that Winn denies state taxpayers standing in the federal
courts. It appears that these plaintiff/taxpayers have state court
381. No. 2:09-CV-02894 (E.D. Cal., Sacramento Div., Oct. 16, 2009), 2009 TNT 201-
10. See also Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding pre-Winn that taxpayers have standing).
382. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the
Establishment Clause? 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633 (2012). However, while I conclude that
the parsonage allowance is constitutional, I also conclude that it is unwise as a matter of
tax policy since recipients of the allowance have the cash to pay the income tax and there
is no valuation issue as there is with housing provided in-kind.
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standing to mount a "taxpayer action ... against the State"3 or to
seek a writ of mandamus as persons who are "beneficially
interested" 384 in the exclusions provided by the California income tax.
Suppose, then, that the California Supreme Court ultimately
holds (as I think it should) that the parsonage allowance does not
violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution 3 Such a decision will be the terminus of the FFRF
litigation since the FFRF taxpayer/plaintiffs, lacking individualized
harm, lack standing in the federal courts and thus cannot obtain a writ
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Suppose that, instead, the Golden State's Supreme Court strikes
California's income tax exclusion for parsonage allowances under the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In that case, the state, as
an injured party, could seek a writ of certiorari to salvage its tax
statute. However, the current officers of California's executive
branch might instead prefer to accept the court's decision and collect
the income tax revenues which result from the court's invalidation of
the state's parsonage allowance exclusion. In the federal courts,
clergy benefitting from the allowance were denied status in the FFRF
litigation as intervening defendants."' If that remains the case and if
the current officeholders were to accept a decision of the California
Supreme Court nullifying the Golden State's parsonage allowance
exclusion under the First Amendment, there would be no ASARCO-
type defendant to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court could not review this First Amendment
decision of the California court.
383. Vasquez v. California, 105 Cal App 4th 849, 852 (2003). See also id. at 854 ("The
individual citizen must be able to take the initiative through taxpayers' suits to keep
government accountable on the state as well as on the local level.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
384. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086.
385. This issue only need be addressed if the California Supreme Court sustains the
parsonage allowance against challenge under the equivalent provisions of the California
Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art I, §4 ("The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.") and art. XVI, §5 ("Neither the Legislature, nor any county,
city and county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall even make
an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of
any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose . . .").
386. See Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836 (9th Cir.
2011) (affirming in part and reversing in part with respect to clergyman's motion to
intervene).
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For those who prefer fastidious outcomes and processes, this
potentially messy result would be disconcerting. However, this
possibility, while untidy, is manageable.
VII. Conclusion
Cuno and Winn definitively end the broader standing
possibilities raised by Flast and confirm that, in the absence of
individualized harm, state taxpayers lack standing in the federal
courts to challenge state expenditures and taxes. Frothingham,
Doremus and their no-taxpayer-standing rule again control the
Court's jurisprudence. Because the states generally have more liberal
taxpayer standing rules than do the federal courts, Cuno and Winn
will not terminate taxpayers' constitutional challenges to state taxes
and expenditures, but will instead channel such challenges from the
federal courts (where taxpayers do not have standing) to the state
courts (where they do). In the aftermath of Cuno and Winn,
municipal taxpayer standing in the federal courts is an historic
anomaly, given the now near-absolute bar in the federal courts on
state taxpayer standing. As a result of the channeling caused by Cuno
and Winn, there will in the future develop in the state courts a body
of law under the U.S. Constitution governing state taxes and outlays.
This body of law will be beyond the review of the U.S. Supreme
Court because of that Court's rejection of state taxpayer standing in
the federal courts. State court judges will be more inclined than their
federal counterparts to uphold state tax and expenditure policies
against constitutional challenge. Consequently, this body of
constitutional law developed by the state courts, lacking direct
supervision by the U.S. Supreme Court, will be more state-friendly
than would a comparable corpus of cases decided by federal judges
under the U.S. Constitution-at least at the margins, perhaps more
fundamentally. This outcome, while untidy, is potentially
manageable.
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